Posted by
Always To The Right on Tuesday, October 30, 2007 5:15:34 PM
This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.
War Plans: United States and Iran
By George Friedman
A possible U.S. attack against
Iran has been a hot topic in the news for
many months now. In some quarters it has become an article of faith that the
Bush administration intends to order such an attack before it leaves office.
It remains a mystery whether the administration plans an actual attack or
whether it is using the threat of attack to try to intimidate
Iran -- and
thus shape its behavior in
Iraq and elsewhere. Unraveling the mystery lies,
at least in part, in examining what a U.S. attack would look like, given U.S.
goals and resources, as well as in considering the potential Iranian
response. Before turning to intentions, it is important to discuss the
desired outcomes and capabilities. Unfortunately, those discussions have
taken a backseat to speculations about the sheer probability of war.
Let's begin with goals. What would the United States hope to achieve by
attacking Iran? On the broadest strategic level, the answer is actually quite
simple. After 9/11, the United States launched counterstrikes in the Islamic
world. The goal was to disrupt the
al Qaeda core in order to prevent further
attacks against the United States. The counterstrikes also were aimed at
preventing the emergence of a follow-on threat from the Islamic world that
would replace the threat that had been posed by
al Qaeda. The disruption of
all Islamic centers of power that have the ability and intent to launch
terrorist attacks against the United States is a general goal of U.S.
strategy. With the decline of Sunni radicalism,
Iran has emerged as an
alternative Shiite threat. Hence, under this logic,
Iran must be dealt
with.
Obviously, the greater the disruption of radically anti-American elements in
the Islamic world, the better it is for the United States. But there are
three problems here. First, the United States has a far more complex
relationship with
Iran than it does with
al Qaeda.
Iran supported the U.S.
attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the U.S. invasion of
Iraq -- for its own reasons, of course. Second, the grand strategy of the
United States might include annihilating Islamic radicalism, but at the end
of the day, maintaining the balance of power between Sunnis and Shia and
between Arab and non-Arab Muslims is a far more practical approach. Finally,
the question of what to do about
Iran depends on the military capabilities of
the United States in the immediate future. The intentions are shaped by the
capabilities.
What, therefore, would the U.S. goals be in an attack against Iran? They
divide into three (not mutually exclusive) strategies:
1. Eliminating Iran's nuclear program.
2. Crippling
Iran by hitting its internal infrastructure -- political,
industrial and military -- ideally forcing regime change that would favor
U.S. interests.
3. Using an attack -- or threatening an attack -- to change Iranian
behavior in
Iraq, Lebanon or other areas of the world.
It is important to note the option that is not on the table: invasion by
U.S. ground forces, beyond the possible use of small numbers of Special
Operations forces. Regardless of the state of Iranian conventional forces
after a sustained air attack, the United States simply does not have the
numbers of ground troops needed to invade and occupy
Iran -- particularly
given the geography and topography of the country. Therefore, any U.S. attack
would rely on the forces available, namely air and naval forces.
The destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities would be the easiest to
achieve, assuming that U.S. intelligence has a clear picture of the
infrastructure of that program and that the infrastructure has not been
hardened to the point of being invulnerable to conventional attack.
Iran,
however, learned a great deal from Iraq's Osirak experience and has spread
out and hardened its nuclear facilities. Also, given Iran's location and the
proximity of U.S. forces and allies, we can assume the United States would
not be interested in a massive nuclear attack with the resulting fallout.
Moreover, we would argue that, in a world of proliferation, it would not be
in the interest of the United States to set a precedent by being the first
use to use nuclear weapons since
World War II.
Therefore, the U.S. option is to carry out precision strikes against Iran's
nuclear program using air- and sea-launched munitions. As a threat, this is
in an interesting option. As an actual operation, it is less interesting.
First, the available evidence is that
Iran is years away from achieving a
deliverable nuclear weapon. Second,
Iran might be more interested in trading
its nuclear program for other political benefits -- specifically in
Iraq. An
attack against the country's nuclear facilities would make Tehran less
motivated than before to change its behavior. Furthermore, even if its
facilities were destroyed,
Iran would retain its capabilities in
Iraq,
Lebanon and elsewhere in the world. Therefore, unless the United States
believed there was an imminent threat of the creation of a deliverable
nuclear system, the destruction of a long-term program would eliminate the
long-term threat, but leave Iran's short-term capabilities intact. Barring
imminent deployment, a stand-alone attack against Iran's nuclear capabilities
makes little sense.
That leaves the second option -- a much broader air and sea campaign against
Iran. This would have four potential components:
1. Attacks against its economic infrastructure, particularly its
refineries.
2. Attacks against its military infrastructure.
3. Attacks against its political infrastructure, particularly its
leadership.
4. A blockade and sanctions.
Let's begin in reverse order. The United States has the ability to blockade
Iran's ports, limiting the importation of oil and refined products, as well
as food. It does not have the ability to impose a general land blockade
against
Iran, which has long land borders, including with
Iraq. Because the
United States lacks the military capability to seal those borders, goods from
around Iran's periphery would continue to flow, including, we emphasize, from
Iraq, where U.S. control of transportation systems, particularly in the
Shiite south, is limited. In addition, it is unclear whether the United
States would be willing to intercept, board and seize ships from third-party
countries (
Russia,
China and a large number of small countries) that are not
prepared to participate in sanctions or might not choose to respect an
embargo. The United States is stretched thin, and everyone knows it. A
blockade could invite deliberate challenges, while enforcement would justify
other actions against U.S. interests elsewhere. Any blockade strategy assumes
that
Iran is internationally isolated, which it is not, that the United
States can impose a military blockade on land, which it cannot, and that it
can withstand the consequences elsewhere should a third party use U.S.
actions to justify counteraction, which is questionable. A blockade could
hurt Iran's energy economy, but
Iran has been preparing for this for years
and can mitigate the effect by extensive smuggling operations. Ultimately,
Iran is not likely to crumble unless the United States can maintain and
strengthen the blockade process over a matter of many months at the very
least.
Another option is a decapitation strike against Iran's leadership -- though
it is important to recall how this strategy failed in
Iraq at the beginning
of the 2003 invasion. Decapitation assumes superb intelligence on the
location of the leadership at a given time -- and that level of intelligence
is hard to come by. Iraq had a much smaller political elite than
Iran has,
and the United States couldn't nail down its whereabouts. It also is
important to remember that
Iran has a much deeper and more diverse leadership
structure than
Iraq had. Iraq's highly centralized system included few
significant leaders.
Iran is more decentralized and thus has a much larger
and deeper leadership cadre. We doubt the United States has the real-time
intelligence capability to carry out such a broad decapitation strike.
The second option is an assault against the Iranian military. Obviously, the
United States has the ability to carry out a very effective assault against
the military's technical infrastructure -- air defense, command and control,
aircraft, armor and so on. But the Iranian military is primarily an infantry
force, designed for internal control and operations in mountainous terrain --
the bulk of Iran's borders. Once combat operations began, the force would
disperse and tend to become indistinguishable from the general population. A
counterpersonnel operation would rapidly become a counterpopulation
operation. Under any circumstances, an attack against a dispersed personnel
pool numbering in the high hundreds of thousands would be sortie intensive,
to say the least. An air campaign designed to impose high attrition on an
infantry force, leaving aside civilian casualties, would require an extremely
large number of sorties, in which the use of precision-guided munitions would
be of minimal value and the use of area weapons would be at a premium. Given
the fog of war and intelligence issues, the ability to evaluate the status of
this campaign would be questionable.
In our view, the Iranians are prepared to lose their technical
infrastructure and devolve command and control to regional and local levels.
The collapse of the armed forces -- most of whose senior officers and noncoms
fought in the Iran-Iraq war with very flexible command and control -- is
unlikely. The force would continue to be able to control the frontiers as
well as maintain internal security functions. The United States would rapidly
establish command of the air, and destroy noninfantry forces. But even here
there is a cautionary note. In
Yugoslavia, the United States learned that
relatively simple camouflage and deception techniques were quite effective in
protecting tactical assets. The Iranians have studied both the Kosovo war and
U.S. operations in
Afghanistan and
Iraq, and have extensive tactical combat
experience themselves. A forced collapse from the air of the Iranian infantry
capability -- the backbone of Iran's military -- is unlikely.
This leaves a direct assault against the Iranian economic infrastructure.
Although this is the most promising path, it must be remembered that
counterinfrastructure and counterpopulation strategic air operations have
been tried extensively. The assumption has been that the economic cost of
resistance would drive a wedge between the population and the regime, but
there is no precedent in the history of air campaigns for this assumption.
Such operations have succeeded in only two instances:
Japan and Kosovo. In
Japan, counterpopulation operations of massive proportions involving
conventional weapons were followed by two atomic strikes. Even in that case,
there was no split between regime and population, but a decision by the
regime to capitulate. The occupation in
Kosovo was not so much because of
military success as diplomatic isolation. That isolation is not likely to
happen in
Iran.
In all other cases --
Britain,
Germany,
Vietnam,
Iraq -- air campaigns by
themselves did not split the population from the regime or force the regime
to change course. In
Britain and
Vietnam, the campaigns failed completely. In
Germany and
Iraq (and
Kuwait), they succeeded because of follow-on attacks by
overwhelming ground forces.
The United States could indeed inflict heavy economic hardship, but history
suggests that this is more likely to tighten the people's identification with
the government -- not the other way around. In most circumstances, air
campaigns have solidified the regime's control over the population, allowing
it to justify extreme security measures and generating a condition of intense
psychological resistance. In no case has a campaign led to an uprising
against the regime. Moreover, a meaningful campaign against economic
infrastructure would take some 4 million barrels per day off of the global
oil market at a time when oil prices already are closing in on $100 a barrel.
Such a campaign is more likely to drive a wedge between the American people
and the American government than between the Iranians and their government.
For an air campaign to work, the attacking power must be prepared to bring
in an army on the ground to defeat the army that has been weakened by the air
campaign -- a tactic
Israel failed to apply last summer in Lebanon. Combined
arms operations do work, repeatedly. But the condition of the
U.S. Army and
Marines does not permit the opening of a new theater of operations in
Iran.
Most important, even if conditions did permit the use of U.S. ground forces
to engage and defeat the Iranian army -- a massive operation simply by the
size of the country -- the United States does not have the ability to occupy
Iran against a hostile population. The Japanese and German nations were
crushed completely over many years before an overwhelming force occupied
them. What was present there, but not in
Iraq, was overwhelming force. That
is not an option for
Iran.
Finally, consider the Iranian response.
Iran does not expect to defeat the
U.S. Air Force or Navy, although the use of mine warfare and anti-ship cruise
missiles against tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz should
not be dismissed. The Iranian solution would be classically asymmetrical.
First, they would respond in
Iraq, using their assets in the country to
further complicate the occupation, as well as to impose as many casualties as
possible on the United States. And they would use their forces to increase
the difficulty of moving supplies from
Kuwait to U.S. forces in central
Iraq.
They also would try to respond globally using their own forces (the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps),
as well as
Hezbollah and other trained Shiite militant assets, to carry out
counterpopulation attacks against U.S. assets around the world, including in
the United States.
If the goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear program, we expect the United
States would be able to carry out the mission. If, however, the goal is to
compel a change in the Iranian regime or Iranian policy, we do not think the
United States can succeed with air forces alone. It would need to be prepared
for a follow-on invasion by U.S. forces, coming out of both
Afghanistan and
Iraq. Those forces are not available at this point and would require several
years to develop. That the United States could defeat and occupy
Iran is
certain. Whether the United States has a national interest in devoting the
time and the resources to Iran's occupation is unclear.
The United States could have defeated North Vietnam with a greater
mobilization of forces. However,
Washington determined that the defeat of
North Vietnam and the defense of Indochina were not worth the level of effort
required. Instead, it tried to achieve its ends with the resources it was
prepared to devote to the mission. As a result, resources were squandered and
the North Vietnamese flag flies over what was Saigon.
The danger of war is that politicians and generals, desiring a particular
end, fantasize that they can achieve that end with insufficient resources.
This lesson is applicable to
Iran.