Posted by
On the Right on Wednesday, May 30, 2007 10:48:07 PM
This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.
The Challenge of the Lone Wolf
By Fred Burton Historically, gunmen and bombers who act on
their own -- lone wolves -- have posed a significant threat in the
United
States. Indeed, from the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln to the
slaying of music legend
John Lennon they have presented a far more deadly
threat to prominent people in the
United States than have militant groups.
Additionally, as demonstrated by cases such as the 1991 Luby's restaurant
shooting in
Killeen, Texas, or the recent
Virginia Tech massacre, they also
pose a grave danger to ordinary Americans.
Due to their often
solitary, withdrawn nature, lone wolves present unique problems for security
and law enforcement, as their very qualities make it hard for law enforcement
or protective security details to gather intelligence regarding their
intentions. That said, however, they are not impossible to guard against.
Lone wolves frequently take actions in advance of an attack that make them
vulnerable to detection by a proactive, protective intelligence program that
incorporates investigation and countersurveillance.
Although they
most often are male, there is no single profile of the lone wolf. Some are
ideologically motivated, some are religiously inspired, some are mentally
disturbed, and still others can have a combination of these other factors.
On the ideological side are some leaders (especially among far-right
extremists) who promote the concept of "leaderless resistance." This idea
perhaps was most widely promulgated by former Klansman Louis Beam. In a
February 1992 essay, Beam outlines a plan to overhaul the white supremacist
movement -- calling for the formation of small, autonomous cells that were to
be driven by ideology rather than act under the direction of membership
groups. Beam's argument was that this leaderless resistance would have
superior operational security and be more successful in conducting attacks
than the membership groups, which he believed (correctly) were filled with
informants.
In his essay, Beam envisioned a two-tiered approach to the
revolutionary struggle. One tier would be the above-ground "organs of
information," which would "distribute information using newspapers, leaflets,
computers, etc." The organs of information were not to conduct any illegal
activities. The second tier would be made up of individual operators and
small "phantom" cells that would conduct attacks. These people were to remain
low-key and anonymous, with no traceable connections to the above-ground
activists. Beam wrote, "It becomes the responsibility of the individual to
acquire the necessary skills and information as to what is to be done."
Perhaps one of the most prolific, and least known, ideological lone wolf
terrorists was neo-Nazi Joseph Paul Franklin, who conducted a string of
arsons and shootings from 1977 to 1980 in an effort to spark a race war in
the
United States. Franklin, who frequently targeted mixed-race couples,
killed at least 20 people during his attacks, which by his own account also
included failed assassination attempts against Hustler magazine publisher
Larry Flint and then-National Urban League President Vernon Jordan.
Included in the religious realm are "Phineas Priests," people who believe
they have been chosen by God and set apart to act as his "agents of
vengeance" on Earth. Phineas Priests frequently conduct attacks against
abortion providers and homosexuals -- targets they believe have violated
biblical law. Phineas Priests derive their name from Phinehas, an Old
Testament character who killed an Israelite man and a Midianite woman and who
was credited with stopping the idolatry brought into the midst of the
Israelites by Midianite women.
Most Phineas Priests, including
Buford
Furrow and
Eric
Rudolph, are adherents to the racist and anti-Semitic Christian Identity
religion. Christian Identity, however, does not have a monopoly on
religiously motivated lone wolves. Radical Roman Catholics like
James
Kopp, Protestants such as Paul Hill and Muslims like
Mir
Amal Kansi and D.C. Sniper
John
Allen Muhammad also have committed religiously motivated attacks.
Though many, if not most, of the ideologically and religiously motivated
lone wolves exhibit some degree of mental illness, other mentally ill
attackers have no ideological or religious motivation. Some of these
individuals
";go
postal" and commit their attacks
at
work, while others attack at malls or
schools.
Unlike the ideological (and even some of the religious) lone wolves, who
purposefully choose the leaderless resistance model to thwart law
enforcement, the mentally disturbed are generally self-motivated and
self-contained.
Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme and Sara Jane Moore, both
serving life sentences for attempting to assassinate U.S. President Gerald
Ford during separate incidents, are two rare female lone wolves. Fromme, a
follower of jailed cult leader Charles Manson, pointed a loaded pistol at
Ford in
Sacramento, Calif., on Sept. 5, 1975, but was wrestled to the ground
by a Secret Service agent before she could fire a shot. Seventeen days later,
Moore, an accountant and political radical, fired one shot at Ford after he
left the St. Francis Hotel in
San Francisco, but missed.
The
Problem for Police A prime example of the problem lone wolves
pose for police is Unabomber
Theodore
Kaczynski, who began sending improvised explosive devices in 1978 but was
not arrested until 1996. During those 18 years, Kaczynski sent 16 devices,
several of which either did not explode or did not function as designed.
Although this allowed authorities to recover a large quantity of physical
evidence, Kaczynski's isolation kept him from being identified. It was only
after the publication of Kaczynski's "Unabomber Manifesto" in 1995 that his
brother came forward to the FBI and identified him as a possible suspect.
When investigating a militant organization it is possible for law
enforcement or intelligence agencies to plant informants within the group.
Even small, insular groups are vulnerable because it is not uncommon for one
or more members of the group to get cold feet and inform authorities about
the group's plans to commit acts of violence. With a lone wolf, however,
there is no such possibility of infiltration or betrayal. If the suspect
never discusses his or her plans with anyone else, he or she can easily fly
under law enforcement radar. In most cases, these kinds of individuals can be
highly successful in carrying out an attack, especially against vulnerable
soft targets.
Mentally disturbed lone wolves pose particular problems
because they often have an extremely narrow focus of interest and cannot be
diverted to an easier target by heightened security measures. There are some
notable exceptions to this, however. For example, Furrow conducted
surveillance on several Jewish targets and bypassed some of them because he
considered their security to be too tight, and Franklin diverted from the
Rev.
Jesse Jackson to Jordan after he found Jackson's security to be too
robust for his purposes.
Mentally disturbed lone wolves also
frequently have an almost total disregard for the consequences of their
actions, and quite often show no concern about escaping after they attack, as
exemplified by John Hinckley, who did not attempt to flee after attempting to
assassinate President
Ronald Reagan in 1981. Frequently, as in the case of
Virginia Tech shooter Seung-Hui Cho and Luby's shooter George Hennard, the
attacker will commit suicide.
When lone wolves do choose to escape
and conduct a string of attacks, their anonymous nature and isolation
frequently complicates the situation for law enforcement, especially if they
take efforts to conceal their identities and minimize the amount of physical
evidence they leave. For example, Franklin was able to operate for three
years before he was identified and arrested because he spaced his attacks
apart in terms of geography and time, and frequently changed his vehicles,
weapons and appearance. In fact, it was only after his arrest and confession
that the full scope of his activities was realized. Rudolph also traveled
great distances between targets and took efforts to alter his appearance.
The Threat Because of this history, and the problems
lone wolves pose for them, local, state and federal law enforcement sources
say they are particularly concerned about the threat of individual
extremists. This is not exclusively a big-city problem, as several lone wolf
incidents have occurred outside of major metropolitan areas, in suburbs or
smaller cities. Federal counterterrorism sources, citing the relative ease of
attacking in a public place -- as demonstrated at
Virginia Tech and other
locations -- have expressed serious concern about the possibility of similar
assaults being perpetrated by an Islamist militant or a white supremacist.
The logic is that if a mentally disturbed individual can execute such an
attack, what prevents an ideologically inspired terrorist from doing the same
-- or worse?
Because lone wolves are widely dispersed throughout the
United States and are distributed across the ideological and social spectrum,
it is especially challenging for law enforcement to identify them before they
act. The same is true of potential lone wolf extremists. Moreover, it is
extremely difficult to differentiate between those extremists who intend to
commit attacks from those who simply preach hate or hold radical beliefs
(things that are not in themselves illegal). Therefore, authorities must
spend a great deal of time and resources looking for individuals who might be
moving from radical beliefs to radical actions in an attempt to single out
likely lone wolves before they strike. With such a large universe of
potential suspects, that is akin to looking for a needle in a haystack.
Rearing their HeadsThere are some signals that can be
watched for in connection with lone wolves. In fact, in retrospect, the
majority of lone wolves came to the attention of authorities at some point
before their attack. Frequently in workplace violence and school shooting
cases, the perpetrators are found to have had prior brushes with the law
and/or the mental health system. Attempting to sort lone wolves out from the
heavy stream of people who come to the attention of the police and mental
health professionals, however, is another difficult search through a very
large haystack.
These individuals, though, often frequently exhibit
behaviors by which they reveal themselves.
Lone wolves, especially
mentally disturbed ones, frequently attempt to make written or telephonic
contact with their targets before making physical contact. It is at this time
that they can be identified and investigated by security or law enforcement
personnel. Monitoring the tenor of the contacts from such individuals can
also help to indicate their future intentions and provide indications of a
deteriorating mental state.
Another sign of a possible lone wolf is
when a dedicated and committed extremist suddenly quits a membership group
and goes into "radio silence mode." For example, Bob Matthews and three other
members "left" the National Alliance in 1983 to form the domestic terrorist
group "The Order." In 1999, World Church of the Creator member
Benjamin
Smith, who had been named "Creator of the Year" for his zeal and
dedication, left the group shortly before going on a three-day shooting spree
in
Illinois and
Indiana that randomly targeted racial and ethnic minorities.
Smith killed two people and wounded nine before committing suicide while
being chased by police.
Perhaps the most common time that lone wolf
assailants self-identify -- and the point at which they are
most
vulnerable to being identified before an attack -- is when they are
conducting pre-operational surveillance of their potential targets; when they
are stalking, in other words. Since pre-operational surveillance involves
establishing patterns, potential attackers will stalk their targets several
times. Thus, each time they improve the chance they will be observed,
especially if the target is employing countersurveillance operations in
search of such threats.
Countersurveillance -- the process of
detecting and mitigating hostile surveillance -- is an important aspect of
counterterrorism and security operations. Good countersurveillance is
proactive, meaning it provides a means to prevent an attack from happening.
This can be a group effort performed by a dedicated countersurveillance team,
or it can be done by individuals who simply make the effort to be aware of
their surroundings and watch for people or vehicles that seem out of place.
Lone wolves are especially vulnerable to detection during the
surveillance phase because they do not have others to assist them. Conducting
solo surveillance against a moving target is one of the hardest tasks any
professional surveillance operative can be tasked with, and is even more
difficult for an amateur. In a solo surveillance, the operative is forced to
reveal himself repeatedly over time and distance, and in different
environments. Also, a person unskilled in the art of surveillance, especially
one who is mentally disturbed, will frequently commit many errors of
demeanor. Thus, their odd behavior and crude surveillance technique -- they
frequently stalk and lurk -- make them easy to pick out.
Because of
this, countersurveillance -- whether by law enforcement, intelligence
agencies, corporations or individuals -- is a critical means of spotting lone
wolves during the target selection and planning stage, the time the operation
is most vulnerable to detection and interdiction. It is important to be able
to recognize hostile surveillance by a lone wolf before the next phase of the
attack cycle begins -- because once the actual attack is in progress, it
cannot be undone.