Posted by
Always To The Right on Tuesday, April 03, 2007 8:24:06 PM
This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.
The British Detainees: Reading Diplomatic Signals
By George FriedmanLast week, Iranian forces captured 15
British sailors and marines in the Shatt al-Arab area, where the territorial
distinction between
Iraq and
Iran is less than clear. The Iranians claimed
the British personnel were in Iranian territory; the British denied it. The
claims and counterclaims are less interesting than the fact that the Iranians
clearly planned the capture: Whatever the British were doing in the area, the
Iranians knew about it and had plans to do something in response. The
questions are why, and why is this occurring now?
One explanation is
that the British were on some sort of mission that the Iranians had to stop.
A rumor circulating is that the British were involved in extracting an
Iranian defector, and the Iranians were moving to block the defection. That's
a possibility, but then the captured Britons hardly appeared to be operating
as a covert team -- and if there was a defection under way, the secret had
been blown a long time before, since the Iranians were able to amass the
force used in the capture.
It seems to us that the capture of the
British had less to do with any particular operation than with a more general
desire on the part of the Iranians to capture the personnel and thereby
create an international incident. The important issue, therefore, is why they
wanted an incident, and why this particular sort.
By now, it is no
secret that the Americans and Iranians are engaged in a complex negotiation
that is focused on
Iraq, but which also involves Iran's future nuclear
capability. U.S. and Iranian officials met publicly in early March, and a
further meeting is scheduled, but the most important discussions have taken
place in private venues. It also is clear that there is a debate within
Tehran, as well as within
Washington, as to whether these talks should be
going on, how the negotiations should be carried out and the role of force in
the negotiations. We suspect that the capture of the British detainees had
something to do with the U.S. negotiations and with
internal
Iranian politics.
At this point, both sides in the negotiations
are trying to impress upon each other not only that they retain some options,
but also that their moves cannot be easily predicted. Both want to be seen as
retaining the option of surprise. The capture of the British personnel, then,
should be read not so much as the trigger for an international crisis as a
diplomatic signal. If either the Americans or the Iranians believed it were
possible to achieve their own ideal outcomes in negotiations, either the
capture or the U.S. military surge into
Iraq would not have come about. The
game for each now is an effort to secure an outcome that can be lived with --
not an outright victory.
U.S. Signals and
LimitationsThe U.S. approach to the negotiations with
Iran has
been multifaceted.
- First, by talking simultaneously with the
Sunni insurgents, the Americans clearly have been letting the Iranians know
that they have not been trapped into dealing only with the Iranians or Iraqi
Shia when it comes to the future of Iraq.
- Second, Washington
has tried to keep the Iranian nuclear issue separate from the Iraq issue.
Given that none of the world's great powers truly has an interest in seeing
Iran get the bomb, Washington has international backing on some aspects of
the Iran nuclear issue -- and does not want that confused with the question
of Iraq, where support for its position is much weaker. Washington does not
want to provide the Iranians with linkage between the issues; rather, it
wants to maintain its ability to extract concessions over Iraq in exchange
for concessions on the nuclear issue.
- Third, and most
important, the U.S. leadership consistently has emphasized that it has no
fear of Iran and is not constrained politically or militarily. The entire
objective of the U.S.
surge strategy was to demonstrate that the administration retains
military options in Iraq and is capable of using them. At the same time, the
United States has carefully orchestrated a campaign to let the Iranians
believe that it retains military options against Iran as well -- and is
considering using them. The exercises by two U.S. carrier battle groups last
week had been planned for quite a while and were designed to give the
Iranians pause.
- Finally, the United States has moved to
arrest Iranian officials who had been operating quasi-diplomatic entities in
Iraq. (The Iranians said they were diplomatic and the Americans said they
weren't, so we will term them "quasi.")
Rumors of imminent
U.S. military action against
Iran have swept the region. Totally uninformed
sources around the world have been speculating for weeks about the
possibility of unspecified U.S. action. The rumors suited the Bush
administration perfectly. The administration wanted the Iranians to feel
endangered, so as to shape the Iranian negotiating process. This has
certainly been the case amid congressional action to set a deadline for a
withdrawal from
Iraq. If the Americans are going to withdraw, then
Iran has
no motivation to negotiate; it need only wait. The administration played off
the congressional proposals to hint that the possibility of a forced deadline
increases the pressure for the president to act quickly, rather than to
wait.
The problem for the
United States, however, is the issue of what
sort of action it actually can take. It is in no position to undertake a
ground invasion of
Iran.
Iran is a big country, and occupying it is beyond
the capability of any force the
United States could field -- at least, not
without a massive increase of ground forces that would take several years to
achieve, and that certainly is not under way at the moment.
The other
option is an air campaign. And it is not clear that an air campaign would
work. The example of Israel's failure in
Lebanon last summer weighs heavily.
The Israelis chose the air campaign option and failed to achieve a
satisfactory outcome. The
U.S. Army historically has seen the air campaign as
useful only if it is followed by an effective occupation. The most successful
air campaign, Desert Storm, worked in a much smaller battle-box than
Iran,
and was followed up by a multidivisional ground force in order to defeat the
defending Iraqi force and occupy the territory. In
Iran, the quantity of air
power needed for an outcome similar to that in
Kuwait in 1991 is
substantially greater than the
United States has available, and as we have
said, there is no follow-on ground force capable of occupying
Iran.
The Iranian SignalsThe Iranians, like the
Americans, also have found it necessary to demonstrate a lack of
intimidation. And for
Iran, capturing 15 British sailors and marines was an
excellent device. First, it raised the specter in the
United States of
another Iranian hostage crisis, reminding Bush of how the Iranians handled
Jimmy Carter in 1979. Second, it showed that
Iran is not concerned about
possible retaliation by either the
United States or the
United Kingdom --
which has no options independent of the
United States and is not driving
negotiations over
Iraq. Finally, the fact that action was directed against
the British, rather than the Americans, slightly deflected the intensity of
the crisis; because Americans were not taken captive, there was less pressure
for the
United States to do something about it.
But there is another
dimension to this. The Iranians have shifted the spotlight away from
Baghdad
and to the southern region of
Iraq -- to the area dominated by Shia and held
by the British. The capture of the British personnel coincided with some
fighting in the
Basra area among Shiite militias.
In this way, the
Iranians have sent two signals.
The first was that while the
United
States is concentrating its forces in
Baghdad and Anbar province,
Iran
remains perfectly capable of whipping up a crisis in the relatively quiet
south -- where U.S. troops are not present and where the British, who already
have established a timeline for withdrawal, might not have sufficient force
to contain a crisis. If the
United States had to inject forces into the south
at this point, they would have to come from other regions of
Iraq or from the
already strained reserve forces in the
United States. The Iranians are
indicating that they can create some serious political and military problems
for the
United States if
Washington becomes aggressive.
The
second is a statement about the negotiations over
Iraq. While they are
interested in reaching a comprehensive settlement over
Iraq, the Iranians are
prepared to contemplate another outcome, in which
Iraq fragments into
regional entities and the Iranians dominate the Shiite south. In some ways,
this is more than an acceptable alternative. For one thing, in holding the
south, the Iranians would be in a position to impede or cut U.S. lines of
supply running from
Kuwait to central
Iraq. Second, their forces would be in
a position to bring pressure to bear on
Saudi Arabia, unless the
United
States were to redeploy troops.
In other words, the shift of attention
to the south poses a worrisome military challenge to the Americans. If the
Iranians or Shia were to get aggressive in the south, the
United States could
be forced to spread its troops even thinner, leaving operations in the north
severely weakened. The maneuver could help to collapse the Americans'
position in
Iraq by overloading them with responsibilities.
Call,
Raise -- Draw?The Iranians have called the American hand and
raised the stakes. Where the
United States has been trying to generate a
sense of danger on the part of
Iran with rumors of airstrikes, the Iranians
have signaled that they aren't worried about the airstrikes -- and then
raised the American bet by forcing the
United States to consider what its
options might be if all hell broke loose in southern Iraq.
Tehran is saying
that it has more credible options than
Washington does.
There is
obviously a political debate going on inside
Iran. As we have argued, there
is deep consensus among Iranian leaders as to what outcome they want, but
there is a faction led by older leaders, like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
that does not underestimate the resources of the
United States. And there is
a faction that argues that the
United States, at its weakest, must be
pressured until it capitulates. The capture of the British personnel could
have been designed to enhance the power of the more aggressive faction. But
because Iranian politics are opaque, it could be argued just as logically
that the capture was designed to enhance Rafsanjani's position by setting up
a game of "good cop, bad cop." In other words, Rafsanjani now can ask for
concessions from the Americans to keep the other faction from going too far.
Whatever the inner workings of the Iranian elite, the move
strengthens Iran's negotiating position in a number of ways.
By
holding the British captives, the Iranians are also trying to show the limits
of Anglo-American power to their own public. One of the motives behind the
capture was to demonstrate to Iranians that the Americans are incapable of
taking action against
Iran. (The British were less important in this context
because they never were viewed by
Tehran as being capable of or interested in
decisive action against
Iran.) The capture of the detainees, then, solidifies
Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei's position by revealing American
weakness. If the
United States and the
United Kingdom don't rescue the
prisoners and don't take other military action, holding the detainees
increases the credibility of the Iranian leadership -- not only in relation
to the Americans, but also with the Iranian public.
The logic here
would call for a rescue attempt. However, in order for the captives to be
rescued, the following elements are required:
1. Intelligence on the
captives' location must be perfect, to the point of providing information on
their precise housing.
2. The hostages cannot be housed in multiple
locations; otherwise, the operation becomes both more complicated and more
likely to fail, unless timing is perfect.
3. There must be time to
rehearse the extraction, during which the prisoners must not be
moved.
4. There must be a light covering force protecting the direct
guards. The involvement of heavily armed, trained and dispersed troops at the
battalion level and above, equipped with anti-aircraft systems, makes a
successful extraction very unlikely.
The Iranians are old hands at
this game. We can assume that they have:
1. Obfuscated the location of
the British by communications deception and other means, while moving the
detainees around.
2. Separated the detainees into at least three
groups, one very small and remote from the other two.
3. Obscured the
sites where the British are being held, in order to make model construction
and rehearsals impossible.
4. Covered the detainees with an interior
group of guards embedded in a multi-brigade matrix, with heavy anti-aircraft
artillery and surface-to-air missile concentrations. Preparatory airstrikes
by American or British forces would give away the extraction and force an
abort.
That leaves the
United States with the option of either
accepting the status quo or initiating air operations against
Iran. Now, the
Iranian countermove -- creating chaos in southern Iraq -- seems daunting, but
the Iranians might not have the influence in the region they would like
others to believe: The Iraqi Shia are
highly
fragmented. But on the other hand, the Iranians do not have to impose a
stable regime in southern Iraq right now. All they have to do is create
instability there in order to weaken the Americans.
It comes down to
the question of how lucky the U.S. leadership is feeling at the moment. Given
past performance, we'd say George W. Bush is not a lucky man. If it can go
wrong, it does go wrong for him. Symbolic airstrikes against Iran are
conceivable, but an extended air campaign designed to smash Iran's
infrastructure simply does not appear to us as a viable military option.
Given Iran's size, the number of sorties designed to make a dent would be
enormous. The Americans would be banking on frightening the Iranians into
negotiation. Air power did that in Kosovo, against a country fighting for a
peripheral interest. In Vietnam, it failed. Iran seems more like Vietnam than
Serbia.
Therefore, we expect the United States to signal military
action against Iran but not take it. We also expect the private talks between
Iran and the United States to proceed with some sobriety. The Iranians know
they have a weaker hand than it appears. Taking 15 captives is, in the end,
not all that impressive by itself, and the rest hasn't played out yet. Thus,
the saber-rattling will continue. That's what negotiations look like in the
Middle East.