Posted by
Always To The Right on Tuesday, March 13, 2007 6:16:33 PM
This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.
Two Busted Flushes: The U.S. and Iranian Negotiations
By George FriedmanU.S., Iranian and Syrian diplomats met in
Baghdad on March 10 to discuss the future of
Iraq. Shortly afterward,
everyone went out of their way to emphasize that the meetings either did not
mean anything or that they were not formally one-on-one, which meant that
other parties were present. Such protestations are inevitable: All of the
governments involved have substantial domestic constituencies that do not
want to see these talks take place, and they must be placated by emphasizing
the triviality. Plus, all bargainers want to make it appear that such talks
mean little to them. No one buys a used car by emphasizing how important the
purchase is. He who needs it least wins.
These protestations are,
however, total nonsense. That U.S., Iranian and Syrian diplomats would meet
at this time and in that place is of enormous importance. It is certainly not
routine: It means the shadowy conversations that have been going on between
the United States and
Iran in particular are now moving into the public
sphere. It means not only that negotiations concerning
Iraq are under way,
but also that all parties find it important to make these negotiations
official. That means progress is being made. The question now goes not to
whether negotiations are happening, but to what is being discussed, what an
agreement might look like and how likely it is to occur.
Let's begin
by considering the framework in which each side is operating.
The
United States: Geopolitical CompulsionWashington needs a
settlement in
Iraq. Geopolitically,
Iraq has soaked up a huge proportion of
U.S. fighting power. Though casualties remain low (when compared to those in
the Vietnam War), the war-fighting bandwidth committed to
Iraq is enormous
relative to forces. Should another crisis occur in the world, the
U.S. Army
would not be in a position to respond. As a result, events elsewhere could
suddenly spin out of control.
For example, we have seen substantial
changes in Russian behavior of late. Actions that would have been deemed too
risky for the Russians two years ago appear to be risk-free now.
Moscow is
pressuring
Europe, using energy supplies for leverage and issuing
threatening
statements concerning U.S. ballistic missile defense plans in Central
Europe -- in apparent hopes that the governments in this region and the
former
Soviet Union, where governments have been inclined to be friendly to
the United States, will reappraise their positions.
But the greatest
challenge from the Russians comes in the
Middle
East. The traditional role of
Russia
(in its Soviet guise) was to create alliances in the region -- using arms
transfers as a mechanism for securing the power of Arab regimes internally
and for resisting U.S. power in the region. The Soviets armed
Iraq,
Syria,
Egypt,
Libya and so on, creating powerful networks of client states during
much of the Cold War.
The Russians are doing this again. There is a
clear pattern of intensifying
arms
sales to
Syria and
Iran -- a pattern designed to increase the difficulty
of U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against either state and to increase the
internal security of both regimes. The
United States has few levers with
which to deter Russian behavior, and Washington's ongoing threats against
Iran and
Syria increase the desire of these states to have Russian supplies
and patronage.
The fact is that the United States has few viable
military options here. Except for the use of airstrikes -- which, when
applied without other military measures, historically have failed either to
bring about regime change or to deter powers from pursuing their national
interests -- the
United States has few military options in the region. Air
power might work when an army is standing by to take advantage of the
weaknesses created by those strikes, but absent a credible ground threat,
airstrikes are merely painful, not decisive.
And, to be frank, the
United States simply lacks capability in the Army. In many ways, the
U.S.
Army is in revolt against the Bush administration. Army officers at all
levels (less so the Marines) are using the term "broken" to refer to the
condition of the force and are in revolt against the administration -- not
because of its goals, but because of its failure to provide needed resources
nearly six years after 9/11. This revolt is breaking very much into the
public domain, and that will further cripple the credibility of the Bush
administration.
The
"surge"
strategy announced late last year was Bush's last gamble. It demonstrated
that the administration has the power and will to defy public opinion -- or
international perceptions of it -- and increase, rather than decrease, forces
in
Iraq. The Democrats have also provided Bush with a window of opportunity:
Their inability to formulate a coherent policy on
Iraq has dissipated the
sense that they will force imminent changes in U.S. strategy. Bush's gamble
has created a psychological window of opportunity, but if this window is not
used, it will close -- and, as administration officials have publicly
conceded, there is no Plan B. The situation on the ground is as good as it is
going to get.
Leaving the question of his own legacy completely aside,
Bush knows three things. First, he is not going to impose a military solution
on
Iraq that suppresses both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias.
Second, he has successfully created a fleeting sense of unpredictability, as
far as U.S. behavior is concerned. And third, if he does not use this
psychological window of opportunity to achieve a political settlement within
the context of limited military progress, the moment not only will be lost,
but Russia might also emerge as a major factor in the
Middle East -- eroding
a generation of progress toward making the
United States the sole major power
in that region. Thus, the
United States is under geopolitical compulsion to
reach a settlement.
Iran: Psychological and Regional
CompulsionsThe Iranians are also
under
pressure. They have miscalculated on what Bush would do: They expected
military drawdown, and instead they got the surge. This has conjured up
memories of the miscalculation on what the 1979 hostage crisis would bring:
The revolutionaries had bet on a U.S. capitulation, but in the long run they
got an Iraqi invasion and
Ronald Reagan.
Expediency Council Chairman
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani already has warned the Iranians not to
underestimate the United States, saying it is a "wounded tiger" and therefore
much more dangerous than otherwise. In addition, the Iranians know some
important things.
The first is that, while the Americans conceivably
might forget about
Iraq,
Iran never can. Uncontrolled chaos next door could
spill over into
Iran in numerous ways -- separatist sentiments among the
Kurds, the potential return of a Sunni government if the Shia are too
fractured to govern, and so forth. A certain level of security in
Iraq is
fundamental to Iran's national interests.
Related to this, there are
concerns that Iraq's Shia are so
fractious
that they might not be serviceable as a coherent vehicle for Iranian power. A
civil war among the Shia of
Iraq is not inconceivable, and if that were to
happen, Iran's ability to project power in
Iraq would crumble.
Finally, Iran's ability to
threaten
terror strikes against U.S. interests depends to a great extent on
Hezbollah in
Lebanon. And it knows that Hezbollah is far more interested in
the power and wealth to be found in Lebanon than in some global -- and
potentially catastrophic -- war against the United States. The Iranian
leadership has seen al Qaeda's leaders being hunted and hiding in
Pakistan,
and they have little stomach for that. In short, Iranian leaders might not
have all the options they would like to pretend they have, and their own
weakness could become quite public very quickly.
Still, like the
Americans, the Iranians have done well in generating perceptions of their own
resolute strength. First, they have used their influence in
Iraq to block
U.S. ambitions there. Second, they have supported Hezbollah in its war
against Israel, creating the impression that Hezbollah is both powerful and
pliant to
Tehran. In other words, they have signaled a powerful covert
capability. Third, they have used their nuclear program to imply capabilities
substantially beyond what has actually been achieved, which gives them a
powerful bargaining chip. Finally, they have entered into relations with the
Russians -- implying a strategic evolution that would be disastrous for the
United States.
The truth, however, is somewhat different.
Iran has
sufficient power to block a settlement on
Iraq, but it lacks the ability to
impose one of its own making. Second, Hezbollah is far from willing to play
the role of global suicide bomber to support Iranian ambitions. Third, an
Iranian nuclear bomb is far from being a reality. Finally,
Iran has, in the
long run, much to fear from the Russians:
Moscow is far more likely than
Washington to reduce
Iran to a vassal state, should
Tehran grow too
incautious in the flirtation.
Iran is holding a very good hand. But in the
end, its flush is as busted as the Americans'.
Moreover, the Iranians
still remember the mistake of 1979. Rather than negotiating a settlement to
the hostage crisis with a weak and indecisive President
Jimmy Carter, who had
been backed into a corner, they opted to sink his chances for re-election and
release the hostages after the next president, Reagan, took office. They
expected gratitude. But in a breathtaking display of ingratitude, Reagan
followed a policy designed to devastate
Iran in its war with
Iraq. In
retrospect, the Iranians should have negotiated with the weak president
rather than destroy him and wait for the strong one.
Rafsanjani
essentially has reminded the Iranian leadership of this painful fact. Based
on that, it is clear that he wants negotiations with Bush, whose strength is
crippled, rather than with his successor. Not only has Bush already signaled
a willingness to talk, but U.S. intelligence also has publicly downgraded the
threat of Iranian nuclear weapons -- saying that, in fact, Iran's program has
not progressed as far as it might have. The Iranians have demanded a
timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Iraq, but they have been careful
not to specify what that timetable should look like. Each side is signaling a
re-evaluation of the other and a degree of flexibility in outcomes.
As
for
Syria,
which also shares a border with
Iraq and was represented at Saturday's
meetings in
Baghdad, it is important but not decisive. The Syrians have
little interest in
Iraq but great interest in
Lebanon. The regime in
Damascus
wants to be freed from the threat of investigation in the murder of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and it wants to have its interests
in
Lebanon guaranteed. The Israelis, for their part, have no interest in
bringing down the al Assad regime: They are far more fearful of what the
follow-on Sunni regime might bring than they are of a minority Alawite regime
that is more interested in money than in Allah. The latter they can deal
with; the former is the threat.
In other words,
Syria does not affect
fundamental U.S. interests, and the Israelis do not want to see the current
regime replaced. The Syrians, therefore, are not the decisive factor when it
comes to
Iraq. This is about the
United States and
Iran.
Essential
PointsIf the current crisis continues, each side might show
itself much weaker than it wants to appear. The United States could find
itself in a geopolitical spasm, coupled with a domestic political crisis.
Iran could find itself something of a toothless tiger -- making threats that
are known to have little substance behind them. The issue is what sort of
settlement there could be.
We see the following points as essential to
the two main players:
1. The creation of an Iraqi government that is
dominated by Shia, neutral to
Iran, hostile to jihadists but accommodating to
some Sunni groups.
2. Guarantees for Iran's commercial interests in
southern Iraqi oil fields, with some transfers to the Sunnis (who have no oil
in their own territory) from fields in both the northern (Kurdish) and
southern (Shiite) regions.
3. Guarantees for U.S. commercial interests in
the Kurdish regions.
4. An Iraqi military without offensive capabilities,
but substantial domestic power. This means limited armor and air power, but
substantial light infantry.
5. An Iraqi army operated on a "confessional"
basis -- each militia and insurgent group retained as units and controlling
its own regions.
6. Guarantee of a multiyear U.S. presence, without
security responsibility for
Iraq, at about 40,000 troops.
7. A
U.S.-Iranian "commission" to manage political conflict in
Iraq.
8. U.S.
commercial relations with
Iran.
9. The definition of the Russian role,
without its exclusion.
10. A meaningless but symbolic commitment to a new
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Such an agreement would not be
expected to last very long. It might last, but the primary purpose would be
to allow each side to quietly fold its busted flushes in the game for
Iraq.