Until November 2003, the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi embassy in Washington carried this statement of Islamic supremacism and belligerency on its website: “The Muslims are required to raise the banner of Jihad in order to make the Word of Allah supreme in this world…”

The jihadist website Khilafah.com states: “Islam makes it a duty upon all Muslims to work to change their countries from Dar al-Kufr [the land of unbelief] to Dar al-Islam [the land of Islam]…” It exhorts Muslims to “carry Islam to the world through invitation and jihad.”

The Islamic jihadists, are active in numerous countries around the world, and whose version of Islam is not being effectively combated by any significant movement of peaceful Muslims anywhere.

This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

Psychosomatic Responses: Fear as a Terrorist's Force Multiplier

By Fred Burton

French police wearing hazmat suits ordered the evacuation of the Canadian Embassy in Paris (and the surrounding neighborhood) on Feb. 19 after an employee who opened a suspicious package suddenly fell ill. The package contained a piece of tissue soaked in a liquid that was later found to be nontoxic. On the same day, two workers at the Zondervan Christian publishing company in Cascade Township, Michigan, got sick after opening a suspicious package in the mailroom. The building was evacuated, and one of the employees was rushed to the hospital for treatment. The package later was found to contain no hazardous materials.

The Feb. 19 incidents are just two in a long string of cases in the United States and elsewhere in which someone who opened a letter, package or container found odd substances and had a sudden and dramatic psychological reaction. It is significant, of course, that the contents of the letters in the two recent cases and many others were found to be harmless. Because there were no actual chemical or biological agents involved in these cases, the physiological responses of the "victims" were purely psychological -- most likely a reaction to fear and panic. Overwhelming fear in these situations can cause a person to exhibit physical symptoms -- including dizziness and even loss of consciousness.

That is true for receptionists, mailroom clerks and other typical civilians, but also for others: Police, security officers, firefighters and other "first responders" -- people who are more highly trained than the population at large in dealing with physical threats -- often react this way as well. The implications are obvious: Fears about chemical and biological agents, which are not always readily identified or widely understood, can and do heighten the "terror" aspect of terrorism (real or perceived). In fact, if a chemical or biological attack were to take place in a large U.S. city -- a scenario government security agencies have discussed publicly on many occasions -- the number of people who would become "psychological victims" of the attack could be quite large, and could perhaps dwarf the number of "actual" victims.

As police and other emergency responders have found, however, the most effective antidote to the fear and psychosomatic reactions in such situations is situational awareness and education.

Post-Anthrax Fears

The public's awareness of and reactions to strange substances arriving with crank and anonymous letters has changed markedly during the past five years. Certainly, the tactic was common long before 2001, but "crank" letters and other things viewed today as threatening generally were ignored. A few law enforcement organizations did put some effort into investigating them as time permitted. Many of these agencies worked with the FBI, which would examine the letters and maintain the results of forensic examinations in its "anonymous letter files." But, for the most part, such letters were deemed as a mere nuisance, and even ones that contained things like body fluids were thought of as more "yucky" than "scary."

That mindset changed almost overnight with the emergence of "anthrax letters" in September and October 2001.

Though there were only a small number of cases involved in the entire anthrax scare -- it is believed that seven letters were sent, and five people died -- the incidents had a disproportionate effect on the collective American psyche. The impact was heightened by timing: The first batch of letters was postmarked only a week after the 9/11 attacks, and the second a few weeks later -- during a period when American society as a whole was experiencing an unprecedented sense of vulnerability and fear.

The public fears arising out of the 2001 attacks were augmented by extensive media discussions about the use of anthrax as a weapon, and further heightened by the fact that the perpetrator was never identified or apprehended. There now have been untold thousands of instances in which irrational panic caused office buildings, apartment buildings and factories to be evacuated. Previously ignored piles of drywall dust and the powdered sugar residue left by someone who ate a donut at his desk led to suspicions about terrorists, who suddenly seemed to be lurking around every corner. It didn't matter, in the midst of the fear, that the place where the "anthrax" was found could have absolutely no symbolic or strategic value to the Islamist militants that most Americans pictured in their minds. The sense of threat and personal vulnerability was pervasive.

Opportunistic pranksters and others quickly found ways to exploit the mentality. For example, anti-abortion extremist Clayton Lee Waagner, who had escaped from prison in February 2001, reportedly sent more than 500 anthrax hoax letters to abortion clinics throughout the United States in November 2001. Other pranksters followed suit, and anthrax hoax letters containing "white powder" -- such as talcum and cornstarch -- now have been reported by incredibly diverse recipients worldwide. However, even though hoaxes are by now quite common, dramatic psychological responses -- like those seen in Paris and Michigan last week -- remain common as well.

Reactions Explained

There is a scientific explanation for these responses.

Years ago, law enforcement trainers who studied officer-involved shootings made a disturbing discovery: A number of cops were dying from "nonfatal" wounds. In these cases, an officer who had been shot would go into shock and black out, even when the bullet had not struck a vital area. Some died as a consequence of shock; in other cases, the gunman involved followed through and administered a coup de grace.

To combat this issue, many police departments and federal agencies embarked on an aggressive education campaign, teaching officers and agents that a gunshot wound is not always fatal and instructing them to continue to fight, even after being shot. A 1986 shooting involving the FBI and two bank robbers in Miami quickly became a case study used by trainers: A critically wounded criminal kept firing at the agents, and the gunfight was ended by an agent who, though seriously wounded, squeezed off several shotgun rounds with his one working arm. In the wake of the Miami shooting, many departments also implemented "disabled officer" range training courses, teaching police and government agents how to handle and fire their weapons when wounded.

The lessons derived from the firearms study are just as applicable to cases involving real or suspected chemical or biological attacks, in which the potential for psychosomatic reactions also are high. For instance, a police officer in Austin, Texas, passed out cold on the street in October 2000 after he opened the trunk of a terrorist suspect's car, smelled mildew and thought he'd been hit with a chemical weapon.

This fear of chemical and biological weapons should not be trivialized and is not totally unfounded -- as a recent spate of attacks in Iraq that involved chlorine and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices attests. But, again, fear can be tempered and controlled with general awareness and sound information.

Real and Imagined Effects

One thing that biological agents like anthrax generally do not do is immediately incapacitate a person and cause them to black out. In fact, the victims who received real anthrax letters in 2001 did not even realize they had been infected for several days. It is believed that Robert Stevens, the first person to die from the attacks, received his fatal letter around Sept. 22, but he was not hospitalized until Oct. 2, three days before his death. Ernest Blanco -- who, like Stevens, worked in the offices of American Media Inc., in Boca Raton, Florida -- was hospitalized on Oct. 1 for what doctors believe to be pneumonia. (Blanco later was treated for anthrax and survived.) The cases of others infected by anthrax letters also demonstrated that it took many days -- for many, more than a week -- for the spores to germinate and create significant symptoms.

Because biological agents work so slowly, anyone who believes they have been affected by such an attack should attempt to stay calm and remain where they are. They should seal their area as well as possible, shut down any fans or air conditioning systems and immediately call authorities. Anthrax spores, for example, are very small and easily can be spread, infecting others.

Conversely, chemical agents can be rapidly effective if a large dose is inhaled, ingested or absorbed through the skin. However, because these agents (which include sarin and hydrogen cyanide gas) tend to disperse quickly, it is quite difficult to weaponize them in a way that delivers a large lethal dose effectively. In fact, most terrorist attacks involving chemical weapons have been less than devastating. Given the challenges, history has shown that most people exposed to chemical agents in a terrorist attack will not immediately receive a fatal dose -- even in strikes involving an extremely deadly substance, such as sarin.

As a nerve agent, sarin interferes with the chemicals that allow muscles and glands to "switch" off. Symptoms therefore include things like a very runny nose, watery eyes, headache, drooling, excessive sweating, muscle twitches, nausea and abdominal pain. If the victim does not get medical assistance, critical muscles -- such as the diaphragm -- can grow too exhausted to function. Cyanides, like hydrogen cyanide gas, are called "blood agents": They interfere with the body's ability to absorb oxygen, leading to suffocation. Hydrogen cyanide gas will cause symptoms such as headaches, dizziness, nausea and shortness of breath.

Though these symptoms all are somewhat debilitating -- and certainly frightening -- none will keep a victim from leaving the area of the attack and finding fresh air and medical attention. These compounds do pose an immediate threat, but because they are volatile and will disperse rapidly, a victim who does not receive a lethal dose has a good chance of getting away from the source of the agent and surviving. However, if a victim of such an incident passes out for psychological reasons, emergency responders -- unable to communicate with him or her about symptoms or triggers -- will focus on that victim as others who are still conscious perhaps go untreated. And in circumstances that generate a public panic, the effectiveness of emergency teams can be strained or overwhelmed -- perhaps preventing people who actually were exposed to a dangerous substance from getting the medical attention they need.

In short, chemical and biological agents all have their dangers, but the consequences of a psychosomatic reaction differ, depending on the agent used. The means of exposure -- rather than the duration of that exposure -- is the key factor in biological attacks, so even if someone swooned in fear, there still would be time for medical treatment to be effective. However, passing out at the first sign of chemical attack, in which the duration of exposure is key, could prove deadly.

In the Jihadist Context

Information is just as powerful an antidote to fear in the broad context of the U.S.-jihadist war as in the narrow context of mailroom clerks and receptionists handling the daily post.

In this war, the United States and its allies find themselves facing an opponent who takes a long view of the conflict, who claims to be justified in striking at civilian targets and who repeatedly has done so. The jihadists also have demonstrated a fascination with spectacular mass-casualty attacks and in using chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Despite the technical inefficiencies, many jihadists appear to remain fixated on them as "super weapons" -- a mindset perhaps underscored by the recent chlorine attacks in Iraq. In fact, we are rather surprised that there have not been more reports of actual or attempted chemical or biological attacks, given al Qaeda's history in this area.

Overall, there remains a very real possibility that al Qaeda or a group of grassroots jihadists might attempt a chemical or biological attack in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada or another allied country in hopes of inflicting mass casualties.

One attack of this sort, or even a series of them, likely would not achieve the "weapon-of-mass-destruction-level" results of 9/11. But a certain level of danger does exist -- and without situational awareness, a general understanding of risks and proper responses, or a contingency plan, the potential for deadly results is amplified.

An argument that is often heard from defenders of Islam is that the terrorists of their religion can't be true Muslims because their targets are sometimes Muslim as well. 

But what these apologists leave out is the fact that in Islam there is a category of Muslims called 'hypocrites' or munafiqin, who are hated even more than non-believers.  These are considered to be Muslim in name only and judged to be doubters or unbelievers by their refusal to join the fight against the infidel.  Islamic scholars following Muhammad declared that these Muslims would occupy the hottest part of Hell (hence, their lives are of little earthly value).

The fact that terrorists kill other Muslims because they believe them to be the 'hypocrites' that Muhammad frequently spoke of could not have been made any plainer than it was in Pakistan yesterday, when a teacher was abducted and beheaded by the Mujahideen.  On the forehead of the severed head, the Islamists wrote the word 'Munafiqin."

Salt Lake Jihad  Yet another good article from MIM on some of the pertinent details of the attack that never made it into the mainstream media.

The Inconvenient Truth about Our Real Enemy  Anti-Americanism drives selective outrage on college campuses, where the only taboo is against speaking ill of Islamic terrorists.

Today's story from the Jerusalem Post answers the question that we asked below about whether there is any decency left in the Islamic world.  Six Arab Israelis have been arrested for kidnapping and gang raping Jewish women as young as 13 over a two year period, saying that it was "revenge" for what the IDF is "doing to Palestinians."

We'll keep our ears open, but we doubt that there will be even the slightest outrage from other Muslims over this deeply dishonorable act. 

Islam is truly a breed apart.

This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

The Relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan's Domestic Stability

By Kamran Bokhari

While returning from East Asia on Feb. 26, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney made a surprise stopover in Islamabad, where he met with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The same day, British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett also met with Musharraf, urging him to control the Taliban traffic along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Meanwhile, reports surfaced that U.S. President George W. Bush has sent a strong message to Musharraf, warning him that the Democratic-controlled Congress could cut aid to Pakistan unless Islamabad aggressively cracks down on jihadist activity in the country.

Beckett's was the latest in a long series of calls from senior U.S. officials and those representing Washington's NATO allies for the Musharraf government to do more in the fight against jihadists. Given that the war in Iraq has gone badly for the United States, the Bush administration is under great pressure domestically to show progress in Afghanistan (and by extension Pakistan). Similarly, their military involvement in Afghanistan is a major domestic issue for many European states.

Though political concerns at home are contributing to the U.S./Western pressure on Islamabad to get tougher on the jihadist problem, Pakistan's inability to oblige its Western allies is also a function of its own domestic political concerns. There also is a certain level of unwillingness on Islamabad's part because its interest in maintaining relations with Washington goes beyond having status as an ally in the war on terrorism. The United States and the Europeans understand the concerns of the Pakistanis and do not want to rock the Musharrafian boat, especially when the country is headed into presidential and parliamentary elections beginning as early as September.

That said, the West is not willing to continue with business as usual, which has led to the strengthening of the jihadist forces in Afghanistan and allowed al Qaeda to continue its global operations -- albeit at a reduced pace. From viewpoint of the United States and its NATO allies, the Pakistanis could be doing a lot more without triggering political instability on the home front.

The Pakistanis, on the other hand, say they are fed up with being asked to do more, arguing that using force alone is undermining their own domestic security -- which could indeed start churning up a tide of political instability. Musharraf is caught between the external pressure to assume a more robust attitude with regards to counterterrorism, and dealing with terrorism from within.

On both counts, Islamabad has a point. Following the U.S. airstrike on a madrassa in the northern part of the tribal belt in late October 2006, jihadists have unleashed an unprecedented wave of suicide attacks across the country against government and Western targets. Other than a few bombings against Western targets and assassination attempts against Musharraf, jihadists had not attacked inside Pakistan. In fact, until this recent wave of suicide attacks, jihadists in Pakistan were using the country as a launchpad for attacks against third parties.

This nascent jihadist insurgency does not have widespread support within the country and, given the militants' limited capabilities, is a problem Pakistani security forces can handle. The real obstacles to Musharraf's ability to wage a successful crackdown have to do with domestic political stability in light of the coming elections.

At present, Musharraf's domestic position is secure, in that no political force (party or even a coalition of parties) exists that can remove him from office through mass unrest. The fact that the political structure that emerged from the 2002 elections is managing to reach the end of its term clearly underscores his ability to maintain power. This, to a great degree, is the result of Musharraf being a military ruler.

Despite the military-dominated political order, however, the current civil-military government is not completely exempt from public accountability, especially if it expects to garner votes. On the contrary, the civilian setup that Musharraf is relying on to sustain his hold on power and to keep his political opponents at bay is a complex system crafted with great difficulty. Musharraf has kept this system afloat by forging alliances and creating and sustaining divisions among the opposition parties.

Both the president and the parliamentary component of his regime will have to pass the test of elections. Musharraf has told Stratfor he wants to remain president for another five years to reach the goals he has outlined for himself. For this he needs to have the current ruling coalition led by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), at a bare minimum, retain its majority in the parliament and its current standing in the provincial legislatures. Accomplishing this task could guarantee his re-election as president.

But Musharraf is uncertain whether the next round of parliamentary elections -- set for January 2008 -- will produce the desired results, which is why he has moved to hold the presidential election in September. This way he can be certain of his own re-election as president in the event that his allies are not able to retain their majority in the federal and provincial legislatures.

Musharraf's opponents, however, are up in arms over his bid to seek a second term from the same electoral college. So the question is, can the opposition pull together the much-discussed grand alliance to force Musharraf's hand? Here is where terrorism and counterterrorism play a pivotal role in shaping events. Attacks in the country, along with the government's counterterrorism efforts, can create a dynamic that his opponents can exploit to generate public unrest. Certain forces already are taking advantage of the suicide attacks as an opportunity to target rival political forces in the hope of stirring political unrest ahead of the elections.

The purpose of the jihadist suicide bombing campaign is to create enough political problems for the Musharraf government to force Islamabad's attention away from counterterrorism operations. The situation in Afghanistan and the threat from the wider jihadist movement, however, has Musharraf under pressure to stay focused on counterterrorism. Thus, he needs to be able to figure out a way to satisfy international demands with regards to counterterrorism and keep his opponents from undercutting stability.

While Musharraf is reluctant to take on the risks associated with going after the Afghan Taliban, he is also deeply worried about the Talibanization of certain parts of his own country. In particular, the jihadists' influence is growing in the Pashtun-dominated areas in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and northwestern Balochistan.

Musharraf also wants to be able to roll back the power of the six-party Islamist political coalition, Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). The MMA not only controls the NWFP government and is part of the coalition government with the pro-Musharraf PML in Balochistan, but also is the largest opposition bloc in the national parliament. The Islamists, who historically were divided and never gained more than a handful of seats in any previous election, contested the 2002 elections on a single platform and exploited the anti-American sentiment among the Pashtuns and others in the country in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001.

Another key reason behind the MMA's extraordinary showing at the polls was the fact that the mainstream opposition parties -- the Pakistani People's Party-Parliamentarians (PPP-P) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) -- were marginalized because of certain electoral and constitutional engineering aimed at preventing the two groups from making significant gains in the elections. Furthermore, the Musharraf government engineered a significant number of post-election defections of parliament members from the PPP-P. The PPP-P emerged as the largest opposition party in parliament in the last elections. The defections, however, decreased the number of seats it controlled -- and the MMA, which was in third place, emerged as the largest opposition bloc.

Since the last elections, Musharraf has seen how the military's historical relationship with Islamist and jihadist forces has cost the country -- and not just in terms of external pressure. It also has allowed these forces to emerge as a threat on the domestic front. Though the jihadists have staged a few suicide bombings in response to counterterrorism operations by Pakistani and U.S. forces, the MMA can exploit this issue in the elections, potentially consolidating its hold in the Pashtun areas and even enhancing it.

This would explain why Musharraf sees the coming parliamentary elections as a decisive battle between the forces of extremism and moderation. Though Musharraf might have clearly identified the battle line, he faces problems in gathering the forces of moderation to defeat the radicals.

The quandary has to do with the fact that two critical moderate political forces -- the PPP-P and the PML-N -- are not ready to do business with him. These two parties, which together form the secular opposition bloc called the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), are not willing to accept a president in military uniform.

That he is the president as well as the military chief is not only the source of Musharraf's power; it is also the biggest sore point with regard to his future as leader of the country. Musharraf realizes that at some point he needs to step down as chief of the army staff. But from his point of view, how does he do so without incurring a loss of sovereignty? One way to do this, perhaps, is to change the political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one.

Considering that the constitution says the country should have a parliamentary form of government, he needs to be able to balance the powers of the parliament with those of the presidency. This can be done by amending the constitution in keeping with a negotiated power-sharing mechanism. This way Musharraf could retain control over power by serving as a balance between the military establishment and the civilians. But for this to materialize, he and his allies must get over the hurdle of the twin elections. In this respect, there are two possible outcomes.

1. Musharraf is able to get re-elected in September without any backlash from the public, meaning he is able to keep not just the ARD and MMA apart, but also to sustain internal divisions within the two alliances. Additionally, his civilian allies at a bare minimum retain more or less the same number of seats in the incumbent legislatures. Given the divided state of the Pakistani electorate, achieving this objective is not impossible.

2. Should an outcry occur over vote-rigging -- one big enough for the opposition to exploit -- then Musharraf would be in trouble, both and home and abroad. The Bush administration, for instance, would not want to come out in support of him in the wake of mass cries of fraud. In such a situation, things could spiral out of hand and he could be forced to step down. In the event of major public protests, even his generals could be forced to call on him to step down or strike a compromise with the opposition.

Musharraf would want to avoid at all costs the latter outcome, which means his government cannot afford to allow the opposition to exploit the issue of electoral fraud. This is why it is even more important that he not engage in actions that will make it even more difficult for him and his allies to get re-elected.

This complex domestic political situation raises the question of whether the United States and its allies can delay their demand for Islamabad to take more action until after the electoral storm for Musharraf has passed. In many ways it is a timing issue because NATO is looking at the coming spring offensive from the Taliban and needs Pakistani cooperation to act. Musharraf and Washington, therefore, likely will work out a formula whereby the jihadists can be dealt with without creating problems for Musharraf in the elections. This is because, from Washington's point of view, long-term success in the war against the jihadists depends on political continuity in Islamabad.

The Information Age may pose the greatest threat that Islam has ever faced, particularly in the uncensored West.  Many Muslims are finding out for the first time that the details of their prophet’s life are very much out of step with the revered image of a perfect and holy man.  Neither are educated Westerners finding many aspects of Islamic law to be compatible with their own values.

Muslim countries meet the challenge by censoring the information flow, blocking websites and banning the sales of certain books.  They do not allow other religions to evangelize or speak ill of Islam or its prophet, which insulates the Muslim world from critical thought.

Muslim organizations in the West face greater obstacles.  Islam, as it is popularly believed by many Muslims, has almost become a parallel religion to the Islam revealed in the Qur’an and Sunnah.  Many Muslims are taught that Islam is not much different than the Judeo-Christian tradition, and seem at a loss to explain the death and destruction done explicitly in the name of Allah.

There is a tendency for Westerners to play along with this false perception of Islam instead of demanding accountability and hard answers.  It isn’t just secular multiculturalists who are to blame either.  “6^th Column against Jihad” produced an excellent article on The Religion Barrier that should be required reading for every non-Muslim, particularly those who are religious.  Christians and Jews are susceptible to being taken in by the misconception that Islam is just another Abrahamic faith like theirs, with the noble goals of peace and universal brotherhood.

But the reality is quite different.  Despite the fact that many Muslims in the West follow more of a “pseudo-religion,” the real Islam always has a way of emerging from the holy texts and recruiting from the mainstream.  The result is not just violence, but the slow strangling of the host through a series of unilateral concessions that do nothing more than tighten the death grip of Islamacism.

Islamic organizations in the West use the “Religion Barrier” and the language of religious tolerance to fend off the challenge posed by the Information Age.  While thousands of people are butchered in the name of Allah each year, these apologists insist that the religion behind the violence should be just as immune from criticism here as it is in those parts of the world over which it has a stranglehold.

The Islamists know that suppressing knowledge and critical thinking is the key to defeating our culture and freedoms.  It therefore follows that education and critical thought are also our best defense against this darkness.