Posted by
Always To The Right on Wednesday, December 13, 2006 7:04:32 AM
This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.
Venezuela: Documenting the Threat
By Fred Burton With another election under his belt,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez appears destined to remain in power until at
least 2013 -- and, if his attempts to amend the constitution to abolish term
limits succeed, perhaps even longer. Obviously, so long as Chavez -- one of
the most colorful and strident leftist leaders in
Latin America -- remains in
power and touting the appeals of his Bolivarian Revolution, there will be no
appreciable change in the tenor of U.S. relations with
Caracas.
One of
the more serious sticking points in the relationship in recent years has been
the role
Venezuela plays in fueling illegal immigration into the
United States. A House subcommittee report released in October -- titled "A Line in
the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border" -- noted that U.S.
military and intelligence officials believe
Venezuela is emerging as "a
potential hub of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere" because "the Venezuelan
government is issuing identity documents that could subsequently be used to
obtain a U.S. visa and enter the country." The theme and tone of the
congressional report are similar to those struck by the State Department's
principal deputy coordinator for counterterrorism, Frank Urbancic Jr., who
testified before Congress in July on the topic: "Venezuela: Terrorism Hub of
South America?"
Washington has very real cause to be concerned in
this regard. For years,
Venezuela has been one of the most significant ports
of entry into the Americas for aliens from other parts of the world --
including many "special interest" aliens from countries like
Pakistan and
Afghanistan -- due to lax visa laws and a culture of official corruption.
However, any true assessment of
Venezuela as a security threat to the
United States must be kept separate from the political issues related to Chavez and
his purposely annoying
anti-U.S.
rhetoric. For one thing,
Venezuela's role as a transit point for aliens
being smuggled into the
United States predates Chavez and his leftist regime.
For another, the Venezuelan president would incur unnecessary risk to his
position and his country if he were to knowingly assist jihadists planning a
strike on U.S. soil. More to the point, the jihadists would gain nothing from
fostering such a relationship either.
As it stands, there is plenty
of opportunity for illegal immigrants and more sinister types of criminals to
transit
Venezuela -- and obtain Venezuelan identity documents there --
without any government assistance whatsoever.
Venezuela as
Hemispheric GatewaySince long before Chavez came to power,
Venezuela has served as an important portal for people seeking to immigrate
illegally into the
United States -- and as a hub of activity for the criminal
smuggling organizations that make billions of dollars in assisting them.
Large numbers of Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis and immigrants from other Asian
and South Asian countries routinely can be seen passing through
Caracas on
their way to the "promised land."
With this, as with other types of
illicit smuggling, precise figures as to the scope of the problem simply do
not exist. However, figures from the U.S. Border Patrol can begin to shed
light on at least some aspects of the situation: In 2005, the Border Patrol
apprehended about 1.2 million illegal aliens -- 165,000 of whom were from
countries "other than Mexico" (known as OTM aliens). Of those 165,000, a tiny
fraction -- about 650 -- were labeled as coming from "special interest
countries," meaning those the intelligence community believes could be
exporters of terrorism.
There are two important points to bear in
mind when considering such figures. First, they obviously refer only to the
number of apprehensions -- a figure that the Border Patrol believes
represents only 10 percent to 30 percent of the actual number of people who
attempt to cross the U.S. border illegally each year. Second, immigrants with
enough cash to purchase travel documents from a secondary country (such as
Venezuela, in this case) are far more likely to enter the
United States in
some way other than sneaking over the border under cover of
darkness.
Certainly,
Venezuela is not the only landing port in the
Americas for OTM aliens from other regions; they might access the region via
other countries such as
Guatemala,
Belize, the
Dominican Republic and Mexico.
However,
Venezuela is known as a major transit hub, and an entire industry
has developed in
Venezuela around the practice of illegal alien smuggling.
There is an "underground railroad" of sorts that begins in
Caracas and
stretches along the various air, land and sea routes used to move migrants
into the
United States. This network consists of facilitators, document
vendors, pilots, bus and truck drivers, sea captains, small hotels, money
exchanges, restaurants and stores that all cater to illegal immigrants.
As a whole, alien smuggling is a multibillion-dollar industry. Some
immigrants from Asia are thought to pay tens of thousands of dollars for
their passage to the
United States -- a price sufficiently high that alien
smugglers have plenty of cash on hand to make bribes and "gifts" that help to
lubricate the routes of passage. The money goes to immigration inspectors,
visa clerks -- and to politicians who can be persuaded not to pass or seek
the enforcement of laws against alien smuggling in critical "transit"
countries.
This kind of government corruption was established in
Venezuela long before Chavez came to power -- and government workers with a
capitalistic bent have continued these practices, despite the socialistic
ideals of the Bolivarian Revolution.
Mapping the Process
Alien smugglers naturally coalesce around would-be emigrants in a home,
or "sending," country. These smugglers can be grouped into two types of
businesspeople: those who promise direct immigration from the sending country
to the
United States and those who use indirect routes involving transit
countries (routes that often end with immigrants crossing by land over the
U.S.-Mexican border). Those who offer the direct route typically charge a
much higher fee for their services, since the overhead involved in the type
of fraud required (such as paying an American consular officer to issue a
genuine U.S. visa) is considerable. Therefore, entering the
United States
from a transit country such as
Venezuela commonly is seen as the "discount"
route.
Obtaining travel documents is an important part of the smuggler's
services on several legs of the process. For instance, many smugglers help
their passengers apply for passports. Would-be immigrants have legitimate
rights to such passports but frequently are illiterate and cannot complete
the application forms without assistance. Alternatively, alien smugglers
might use counterfeit passports, genuine but altered passports or even
genuine passports that are fraudulently obtained from the transit country.
However, genuine passports from the sending country are generally the
cheapest, easiest and safest.
The next step in the process -- after
gathering passports and the crucial down payments from the customers --
frequently is obtaining visas for the transit country. This is not always a
requirement: For instance, Chinese citizens do not need visas to enter
Venezuela as tourists, but the residents of many other "sending" countries
do. Once the smuggler has visas in hand, he can move his load of aliens to
the first transit country in the Americas. This is a critical passage, and
often the longest leg of the journey.
From that point, movements
become more difficult to track. Alien smuggling is a fluid process that
shifts frequently, following the path of least resistance. If an operation
that takes aliens over the U.S. border into
Arizona is shut down, the
smugglers are likely to divert to another crossing -- perhaps over the border
into
Texas or via sea into
Puerto Rico or Florida. In other words, once the
aliens arrive in their first transit country, they could end up leaving it
for several different destinations, using different modes of transportation.
Therefore, the smugglers often will not worry about obtaining visas for the
second transit country until the last minute, lest they waste their money
pursuing an obsolete route.
Once the path of the second leg has been
determined, alien smugglers either will set about securing visas from the
requisite embassy within the first transit country or -- as is often the case
-- express mail the immigrants' passports to a third country to be stamped if
they have a friendly visa clerk on the payroll there. Therefore, it is not
unusual for a batch of Pakistani passports to be mailed or hand-carried from
Caracas to a place like
San Salvador, where Guatemalan visas can be obtained,
if the smugglers are having problems getting them issued at the Guatemalan
Embassy in
Caracas.
While waiting for their visas, the immigrants are
put up in small hotels and boarding houses. Transit countries are rife with
such establishments. Hotels in places such as
Caracas and Guatemala City are
often filled with Chinese, Indian, Pakistani or Afghan immigrants making
their way illicitly to the
United States.
Of course, not all alien
smugglers go to the trouble of obtaining visas for every transit country.
This is particularly true of smugglers who take their immigrants over land
borders, where security is far more porous than it is at international
airports. It is often easier (and cheaper) to bribe border guards, convincing
them to look away while a bus or truck of aliens passes by their checkpoint.
A Jihadist Precedent Clearly, there is a great deal
of corruption in the "socialist worker's paradise" of Bolivarian
Venezuela.
Alien smugglers, including those whose clientele might include terrorist
operatives, can use this to their advantage, and need not rely on a
left-leaning or anti-U.S. government for assistance, as a 1993 case in
Nicaragua illustrated.
In March 1993, shortly after the bombing of the
World Trade Center, U.S. federal agents executed a search warrant at the
address listed on the driver's license of
Mohammed
Salameh, the Palestinian jihadist who rented the van used in the bombing.
Living at the address was Ibrahim Elgabrowny, an Egyptian who attempted to
assault one of the agents executing the search warrant. Upon arresting him,
the agents found a packet of Nicaraguan identity documents in Elgabrowny's
jacket pocket.
The documents -- birth certificates, passports,
cedulas (national identity cards) and driver's licenses -- had been issued
under innocuous names, but all bore the photos or names of Elgabrowny's
cousin,
El
Sayyid Nosair, his wife Karen and their three children. At the time of
this discovery, Nosair already had been sentenced to a prison term for a
conviction related to the 1990 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, but
investigators had not yet learned of a plan his cohorts had been working on
to free him from New York's Attica prison. Had those plans been carried out,
fraudulent identity documents for Nosair and his family clearly would have
become useful.
Initially, there was suspicion that the Sandinista
government of
Nicaragua had knowingly assisted the militants in issuing the
documents. Certainly, the Sandinistas had offered citizenship to hundreds of
militants from Marxist groups such as ETA, the Italian Red Brigades, the
Tupamaros and Montoneros of
South America and even Middle Eastern Marxists
such as the PLO CQ. The Sandinistas also maintained close relations with
Libya (whose embassy in
Managua dwarfed that of the United States) and
Iraq,
and received large quantities of cash from Saddam Hussein and Moammar
Gaddhafi through their "special ambassador to the Middle East" -- Palestinian
militant George Hallaq.
However, an exhaustive U.S. government
investigation determined that the documents found in Elgabrowny's possession
had been issued in a very different way from those knowingly issued to
militant groups by the Sandinistas. In this case -- and much to the
disappointment of some U.S. politicians, who had hoped somehow to tie the
Sandinistas in with the bombing plot in
New York -- it was just plain old
fraud. But from an operational standpoint, this was perfectly logical. There
was no reason for the militants involved in the 1993
World Trade Center
bombing to have incurred the security risks involved in taking the
Sandinistas into their confidence. And making it obvious that they were
obtaining documents for Nosair would have been a clear indication that they
were laying plans of some kind for his freedom.
Conclusion Nothing in this argument is intended to deny
the aid and support that the Venezuelan government
knowingly
provides to members of Marxist groups from
Colombia and other states,
thus contributing to security risks in the region. Nor is there any denial
that al Qaeda and other Islamist groups, such as Hezbollah, have a history of
operations (financial and otherwise) in
Latin America. However, there is no
sincere argument to be made by national security conservatives in the
United States that Chavez himself poses a threat to the
United States by knowingly
aiding and abetting jihadists. The premise might be tempting for policy
wonks, should
Washington (which has been prone to ignoring Chavez while
focusing on weightier matters like Iraq) come to the end of its patience, but
the logic of the situation simply would not support it.
If one has
the right connections, it is relatively easy and inexpensive to purchase
genuine Venezuelan birth certificates, cedulas and passports on the street in
Caracas. These same documents can be purchased almost as easily (though at
higher prices) through document vendors in places like
Brooklyn,
Miami,
London,
Beijing, Karachi or
Madrid. As a result, there doubtless are many
"special interest" aliens -- and perhaps even some actual terrorist
operatives -- who are transiting through
Venezuela and who might obtain
legitimate Venezuelan identification documents. In this case, the "right
connections" need not be wired into the political system at all.