Posted by
Always To The Right on Wednesday, December 27, 2006 4:42:02 PM
This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.
Al Qaeda in 2007: The Continuing Devolution
By Fred BurtonThe theme of Stratfor's 2006
forecast
for al Qaeda and the jihadist movement centered on the evolution -- or the
devolution, really -- from al Qaeda "the group" to a broader global jihadist
movement. This essentially was a shift from an al Qaeda operational model
based on an
"all-star
team" of operatives that was selected, trained and dispatched by the
central leadership to the target, to an operational model that encourages
independent "grassroots" jihadists to conduct attacks, or to a model in which
al Qaeda provides operational commanders who organize grassroots cells. We
refer to this shift as devolution because what we are seeing now is
essentially a return to the pre-9/11 model.
This shift has provided
al Qaeda "the movement" broader geographic and operational reach than al
Qaeda "the group." This larger, dispersed group of actors, however, lacks the
operational depth and expertise of the core group and its well-trained
terrorist cadre.
The metamorphosis continued in 2006, with al Qaeda
announcing the merger of existing jihadist groups such as Gamaah al-Islamiyah
(GAI) in
Egypt
and
Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and others in
the
Maghreb into their global jihadist umbrella organization. These groups
have had long-standing links to al Qaeda, and the announcement of the mergers
is really a formalization of the relationship, though these new nodes joined
al Qaeda's formal network of affiliate groups in
Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, the
Sinai Peninsula and
Afghanistan.
Since the announcements, these new
groups have not yet demonstrated that they possess the ability to boost al
Qaeda's operational effectiveness. We have seen no attacks that can be
attributed to GAI, and perhaps the only attacks that can be attributed to the
GSPC are the Dec. 11 attack against a bus carrying foreign oil workers and
the simultaneous Oct. 30 attacks against two
police
stations in
Algeria. Given this lack of results, the announcements ring
somewhat hollow, as the mergers have not given al Qaeda the surge of momentum
it might have wanted.
The major attacks in 2006 in
Abqaiq,
Saudi Arabia;
Dahab,
Egypt;
Dubba
and Marib, Yemen; and
Damascus,
Syria, were all conducted by existing regional nodes and not the main al
Qaeda organization. These attacks did show a broad geographic reach
stretching across the
Middle East but, except for the Dahab attack, they were
essentially all failures.
Overall, 2006 was not a good year for the
al Qaeda nodes in
Saudi Arabia and the Sinai. It also was a dismal year for
the
Iraq affiliate, whose charismatic leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed
in June. Twelve months have made a vast difference in the fortunes of the
Iraq node. Last year at this time, al-Zarqawi made the headlines almost daily
and his organization was conducting frequent and spectacular attacks. Now,
following the death of al-Zarqawi, al Qaeda in
Iraq has been largely
marginalized and eclipsed by Iraqi Sunni and Shiite insurgent groups.
Going into 2007, we anticipate a continuation of this shift toward a
movement -- though it will be important to watch for any signs of operational
activity by al Qaeda the group, as opposed to its prodigious
public
relations efforts.
The Shift to Soft Targets As
we noted in January, the shift to the broader movement model allowed for an
increase in the number of attacks, although the movement's lack of expertise
was forcing it to focus its attacks against soft targets such as hotels,
trains and subways. This shift resulted in a larger numbers of casualties
than the more spectacular attacks against hardened targets. Indeed, the
casualty count from jihadist attacks in the 52 months following 9/11 was more
than double that of the 52 months prior -- and those numbers would be vastly
increased if the deaths in
Iraq and
Afghanistan were included.
However, not as many attacks occurred in 2006 as we anticipated. In fact,
the number of attacks and the casualties they generated were down for 2006.
In many cases, such as
Damascus, Abqaiq and
Yemen, the attacks resulted in
the deaths of more attackers than victims, and the only attack to produce a
sizable death toll was in Dahab, where 24 people died. This trend in which
attacks against tourist targets in
Egypt produce the deadliest jihadist
attack of the year continued from 2005, when the attack in
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, killed 88 people. (Incidentally, that not only represents far more
victims than in the Dahab attack, but also more than all of the 2006 attacks
combined.) When Sharm el-Sheikh is combined with the 2005 attacks in
Bali,
Amman and
London, jihadist militants produced far more deaths in 2005 than in
2006. (These statistics do not include attacks conducted in war zones or
areas of insurgency such as
Iraq,
Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine,
Chechnya/Russia,
Sri Lanka or Kashmir/India.)
The only jihadist
strike against a hardened target in 2006 was the failed attack against the
U.S. Embassy in
Damascus in September. A car bombing was directed against an
employee of the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi,
Pakistan, but that attack happened a block away from the hardened
facility. It was, however, the only one of the two to produce an American
death.
Target Sets As we said in January, al Qaeda
the group has long been interested in striking financial targets, aircraft
and chemical/petroleum plants. Because of that, and al Qaeda's demonstrated
history of revisiting targets after failed or foiled attacks, it was logical
to project that it would continue to attempt strikes against such targets in
2006.
The petroleum sector indeed was targeted in 2006, as the
strikes against petroleum facilities in Abqaiq and
Yemen, and against oil
contractors in
Algiers, demonstrate. Although no attack occurred against
financial targets as we anticipated, we still believe that target set remains
at risk for the future, along with the others.
Although authorities
thwarted the plot to simultaneously destroy several
airliners
en route from
London to the
United States, it once again demonstrated that al
Qaeda and the jihadist movement maintain a significant interest in airline
targets. Details released in February on the
Library
Tower bombing plot provide another example of this fixation.
Disruption Strategy Continues Once again in 2006 there has
been no successful attack on U.S. soil -- though the thwarted airliner plot
was definitely aimed at the
United States. Likewise, the anticipated attacks
in European locations such as the
United Kingdom,
Denmark, France and
Italy
failed to materialize -- again, not for lack of trying on the part of the
jihadists.
The U.S. government and its allies have been successful
over the past year in disrupting terrorist plots and plans in many locations.
The
strategy
of disruption these countries are following is really quite simple: It is
better to pick up an al Qaeda suspect on immigration fraud or another lesser
offense than to investigate a smoking hole in the ground. Although there has
been significant skepticism over the terrorist credentials of those
responsible for some of these plots, such as the one involving the
Miami
Seven, the plots serve as a reminder that there are people who remain
committed to striking the
United States. Over the years, Islamist militants
have proven to be resilient and adaptable in the face of adversity, and they
will certainly continue to adapt.
It is important to remember that
more than eight years elapsed between the 1993
World Trade Center bombing and
the 9/11 attacks -- during which time al Qaeda and its jihadist network faced
nothing approaching the level of pressure they have endured since then. There
were several thwarted terrorist spectaculars between 1993 and 2001, and yet
the jihadists persisted and eventually succeeded in carrying out a massive
strike on U.S. soil.
Therefore, the string of law enforcement and
intelligence successes since 9/11 does not rule out the possibility of
another strike on U.S. soil in time. We believe the likelihood of such an
attack will increase as memories of 9/11 dim and the public grows weary of
the inconvenience and financial burden of increased security measures.
The Jihadist 'War College' The forecast, which noted that
the active armed struggles in
Iraq,
Afghanistan and the Caucasus still serve
as a kind of "jihadist war college," predicted that its graduates would
continue to share their training and experience upon returning to their
countries of origin.
We already have seen a transfer of
terrorism
tactics and technology to
Afghanistan, and we anticipate that this will
continue in the future. In addition, the interpersonal connections that the
militants make in places such as
Iraq and
Chechnya also will link them to the
global movement in the same way the jihad in
Afghanistan did for the
preceding generation.