This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

A Second Strike: Homing in on Al Qaeda Prime?

By Kamran Bokhari

It has been almost a month since the Oct. 31 airstrike against a madrassa in the village of Chingai in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt. The objective of the U.S. operation was to eliminate a jihadist high-value target, presumably deputy al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

But there has been no videotaped message from the jihadist movement's No. 2 man, and this is unusual. Seventeen days after the first strike in the area, which took place Jan. 13 in the village of Damadola (about a mile from the madrassa), al-Zawahiri appeared in a videotape and tauntingly remarked, "I will meet my death when God wishes. But if my time hasn't come, you and all the earth's forces can't change it, not even by a second. Bush, do you know where I am? I am among the Muslim masses enjoying their care with God's blessings and sharing with them their holy war against you until we defeat you, God willing."

It should also be noted that al-Zawahiri has maintained a steady flow of mostly video-taped communiqués for two years now, and the volume of such tapes has actually increased this year.

Al Qaeda's top leaders have traditionally been so keen on keeping the world abreast of their status that when a major earthquake struck northern Pakistan in October 2005, killing as many as 100,000 people, al-Zawahiri issued a videotape 16 days after the quake to let everyone know the al-Qaeda leadership had not been affected by the temblor.

All of this raises the question: Why have we not heard from al Qaeda's principal theoretician since the Oct. 31 madrassa strike, which killed some 80 people? There are two primary possibilities:

1. Al-Zawahiri was killed in the airstrike, and it will be some time before we hear from either al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden himself or someone who has succeeded al-Zawahiri.

2. The strike on the madrassa hit very close to home and has sent shockwaves through al Qaeda's operational security system, which has forced al-Zawahiri to go deeper underground.

The first possibility seems unlikely for a number of reasons. First of all, had al-Zawahiri been killed, the jihadist communication network by now would have leaked the news of his death. We have seen this happen whenever a senior al Qaeda figure is killed. During the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in November 2001, when al Qaeda's first military chief, Mohammed Atef, was killed in a Hellfire missile strike by a CIA Predator drone in eastern Afghanistan, the jihadists acknowledged that Atef had been "martyred." More recently, in June 2003, al-Zawahiri himself issued a videotaped message mourning the killing of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi some 16 days after al-Zarqawi's death.

Furthermore, all al Qaeda leaders killed thus far have been military commanders, regional leaders and senior operatives, and none of them have had the same stature as that of al-Zawahiri or bin Laden. In fact, there is no one in the jihadist network who can be considered equal to these two top leaders. Therefore, it would be very hard to hide the death of either one, even if U.S. intelligence could not confirm the killing.

While there has not been any tape released by al Qaeda following the Oct. 31 strike, there have been jihadist attacks in response to the madrassa strike. More than 40 Pakistani soldiers were killed Nov. 8 in a rare suicide bombing at an army training base in Dargai, a town about 60 miles north of Peshawar. This followed a Nov. 7 attack in which tribal militants fired rockets during North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) Gov. Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai's visit to the town of Wana, in the tribal belt. A little over a week later, on Nov. 17, two policemen survived a suicide bomb attack against a police van in Peshawar.



Radio Silence

It could be that the Oct. 31 missile strike has created technical obstacles to issuing video-tapes, which would explain why there has not been much output from As-Sahab, al Qaeda's media production arm, since the madrassa was hit. But given that As-Sahab's production facilities are unlikely to be located in the remote tribal badlands straddling the Afghan-Pakistani border, technical difficulties are not likely the case.

The lack of a communiqué from al-Zawahiri is much more likely the result of a conscious decision to maintain radio silence because of a breach in al Qaeda's operational security net. In other words, al-Zawahiri has likely survived, and is trying to stay beneath the radar. The strike in Chingai, while it did not eliminate al-Zawahiri, must have come very close to doing so. Al Qaeda views the location and timing of the madrassa strike as a penetration of the movements and schedules of al Qaeda prime. From al Qaeda's point of view (and probably in point of fact), U.S. and/or Pakistani intelligence has come very close to one of its inner concentric security perimeters.

More significantly, al Qaeda at the time of the strike -- and this may still be the case -- did not know where this penetration had taken place. Therefore, it has brought its communications, especially its communication to the outside world, to a grinding halt. And it is going to maintain this posture until it identifies the security breach and seals it. This could be matter of weeks or of months. Once it is confident that it has re-established operational security, al Qaeda will resume releasing video communiqués.

Implications of the Madrassa Strike

Al Qaeda's move deeper underground shows that U.S. intelligence has come very close to triangulating the likely location of al Qaeda's global headquarters. Stratfor has said the districts of Dir, Malakand and Swat in Pakistan's NWFP are probably the areas in which al Qaeda's top leaders are hiding out. The Oct. 31 and Jan. 13 strikes were more or less in the same area, which borders both Dir and Malakand. This suggests that the Chingai-Damadola area is not just an al Qaeda rendezvous point but also a jihadist thoroughfare, especially since it is bordered to the east by Afghanistan's Kunar province, a hotbed of Taliban and al Qaeda activity.

Both strikes also indicate the problem U.S. forces face in conducting counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. While it is easy to engage in a land or air incursion a few miles into one of the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, it is much more difficult to do so in NWFP because it requires a much deeper incursion into more settled areas. This is something that Islamabad has yet to allow, and Washington continues to oblige.

The two airstrikes have provided U.S. intelligence with a wealth of information, which the United States can use to pinpoint not just the places frequented by al-Zawahiri and his associates but also his actual hideout, as well as other key al Qaeda facilities that probably lie much deeper in the NWFP. This poses a dilemma for al Qaeda, which does not have the luxury to simply shift from one location to another, and this would again explain the decision to go offline.

Al-Zawahiri's statement in the videotape issued after the first airstrike is actually quite telling: "Bush, do you know where I am? I am among the Muslim masses enjoying their care…." Al Qaeda's leaders are likely hiding very close to if not in a heavily populated area that is quite far from the Afghan-Pakistani border. This is actually the best defense the jihadists have in their arsenal; they believe it is unlikely that U.S. forces would conduct a strike so deep inside Pakistan and in an area so densely populated.

Ultimately, finding and hitting al Qaeda's top leaders depends not only on human intelligence but also on the willingness of the United States to accept the risks of carrying out strikes that can actually eliminate al-Zawahiri and bin Laden. The biggest risk, at this point, is the destabilization of the government of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

These paragraphs are from a column by Walter Williams, the entire column can be read here "The bottom line: We love government because it enables us to accomplish things that if done privately would lead to arrest and imprisonment. For example, if I saw a person in need, and I took your money to help him, I'd be arrested and convicted of theft. If I get Congress to do the same thing, I am seen as compassionate.

This vision ought to bother the Christians among us, for when God gave Moses the commandment "Thou shalt not steal," I'm sure He didn't mean thou shalt not steal unless you got a majority vote in Congress."

Islamic groups in America, angered over the removal of six imams from a flight last week, are encouraging Muslims to boycott airline travel.  This should be good news for commuters, but bad news for air marshals, who may be put out of work by the boycott.

From Steven Spielberg's "War of the Worlds" to a recent episode of The Simpsons, Hollywood is starting to sneak not-so-subtle aphorisms about Iraq into their scripts.  Hearing a character say something like, "An occupying force can never be successful against a determined local population" is one example of this effort to (at best) bring a sly smile to the lips of viewers.

However, we suspect that the people most amused by such a remark might also be the least knowledgeable.  In truth, occupying forces have been very successful against local populations when given a free hand to crush local opposition - just ask any locals still left in Tibet.

Thanks to a near absence of international pressure, the Syrians also had a good thing going in Lebanon, until they overplayed their hand by assassinating Hariri.  Of course, you can't blame them for getting complacent.  A decades-old UN security resolution for them to leave was so meaningless that Syria actually served on the Security Council while touting a brutal reign in Lebanon that ensured permanent Muslim supremacy in what had been the last Christian Arab state.

The most successful occupiers of all have been Muslims themselves, which is ironic given their sanctimonious complaints about American intervention in Iraq.  The Arab occupation of most of the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Asia is comfortably into its second millennium.  This includes Iraq itself, which was the home of Christian Assyrians before the Arab invasion.

When Muslim armies rolled into a city, they immediately slaughtered those who defended it.  Sometimes women, children, and other civilians were killed as well, but most of the time they were taken as slaves.  The citizens left alive were offered the choice of converting to the peaceful religion of Islam.  Those who didn't were assigned third-class status and forced to finance the Muslim religion and its on-going conquests of other nations.

Nothing like this is happening in Iraq, where the Americans have done their best to give the locals their own freely-elected government.  The credulity of lumping Iraq with other historical military occupations is stretched even further by the fact that the Americans have taken casualties to avoid civilian casualties - not something that Muslim conquerors were terribly concerned with in their time.  And, rather than mounting a "determined resistance," the local population is being decimated by foreign-supported terrorists who are trying to trigger civil war.

Although the Americans are not taking slaves, imposing their religion, or showing any interest in governing Iraq, a true occupation of the country would still be just as successful if they were to adopt the same practices as the Islamic armies of the past...

And what would Muslims think of that?

I am going to list a number of quotes and I challenge people to come up with the answer that ties all of them together.  This has nothing to do with politics, etc.

"Free advice is seldom cheap"

"Keep your ears open"

"Don't trust a man wearing a better suit than your own"

"No good deed ever goes unpunished"

"War is good for business"

"Peace is good for business"

"Sometimes the only thing more dangerous than a question is an answer"

"Every man has his price"

"Once you have their money . . . never give it back"

"Opportunity plus instinct equals profit"

"Dignity and an empty sack is worth the sack"

I think we should all give U.S. Airways a call and tell them they did the right thing in removing the 6 Imams from one of their flights.   The six claim they were just Imams returning from a conference  in Minneapolis.  The six were acting in a very [it has been reported] strange manner.  Are they victims or provocateurs?  Turns out the new Rep-elect Ellison [to be the first Muslim sworn into Congress] was also at the same conference [he also wants to criminalize Muslim profiling].  Ellison has spoken out against US Airways for "prejudice and ignorance."  Incoming House Judiciary Chairman Conyers [D-Mich] wants to give Muslims "special civil rights."    

 

This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

The Missing Voices in the Iraq War Debate

By Bart Mongoven

In its first symbolically significant act since the midterm elections, the Democratic Party selected Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) as House majority leader, dealing a blow to Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), the face of the party's anti-war faction. The decision was made with an eye on the 2008 presidential elections, and is only the latest in a long series of events that suggest the Democratic Party's long-term strategy has no clear place for the party's anti-war faction or rhetorical space for its messages.

This points to an unusual dilemma in U.S. politics, and to an even more unusual atmosphere inside the Washington beltway.

Though the war in Iraq continues -- omnipresent in the media, foreign policy discussions and the calculations of other powers -- it is curiously absent as a driving force in Beltway processes and political machinery. We do not mean this, by any stretch, to imply that politicians do not discuss or think about the war, but there is a striking contrast between the atmosphere in Washington and that in the rest of the country (or at least in the media) when it comes to Iraq. There also is a striking contrast between Washington's attitude toward this war and past wars, in which numerous federal government agencies and the business lobby all had a clear stake. As retired Gen. William McCaffrey, now a professor at West Point, has stated, "Inter-agency support for our U.S. Iraq strategy is grossly inadequate. Only the armed forces and the CIA are at war."

There are numerous reasons for this state of affairs. Some are rooted in the Democratic Party, which is attempting to reinvent itself after its long wanderings in the political wilderness. Some are rooted in the personal and political dynamics of the Republican Party and the Bush White House -- and even more significantly, in the "business as usual" mantra the administration adopted following the 9/11 attacks. In both cases, there is a clear sense that the war, though a burning priority for voters, does not intersect with the major political battles now being waged to win the presidency in 2008.

The Democrats and the War

Given the percentage of voters who, while not anti-war, are heartily displeased with the Bush administration's handling of Iraq, it is noteworthy that the Democratic Party has not publicly adopted a position that places the war issue squarely at the center of its identity.

This did not pose a tremendous obstacle, of course, to winning the Nov. 7 elections. The Democrats already had the support of anti-war voters and were able to make serious incursions into the GOP support base by attracting Republicans who were disgruntled with the administration. Taking a strong anti-war stand during the election campaign would have been damaging to the Democrats: It would have attracted few additional anti-war votes and inevitably would have alienated the rebellious Republican swing voters. Therefore, saying as little as possible about the war was the wisest political strategy.

That strategy having been successful, however, Democrats are now in power and are expected to take a stand on the war. In the Murtha-Hoyer decision, their first act was to punt.

There is more to the equation than this, of course. There is enough ethical baggage in Murtha's past that it would have been awkward (to say the least) for the Democrats, under his majority leadership, to push the Republicans on ethical issues. Nevertheless, the anti-war faction of the Democratic Party is not represented in the new congressional leadership. So far, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) has made more noise than any party leader about the war -- and his proposal to reinstate the draft is an interesting political tactic, but it is far from turning the war into a strategic issue for the party.

The deeper explanation for the party's position -- or lack of position -- on the war is complex. The civil rights, labor, environmental and other major sub-groupings that make up its traditional base are not focused on the war because the political strategies they are following do not have a place for the war or for anti-war activists. Consequently, the Democratic Party's long-term efforts to coalesce these groups around a set of core values does not center on the war -- which, again, is a polarizing issue. And that means the party has not pushed for the anti-war faction to be represented in the new congressional leadership.

The Atmospheric Backdrop

That the Republican Party and interest groups have given the Democrats a free pass on the issue is another remarkable element of the situation. For a variety of reasons, the GOP leadership is in no position to beat up Democrats as being wishy-washy -- and in so doing, exacerbate tensions over its own prosecution of the war.

The GOP's inability to capitalize on the Democrats' indecision is an immediate, tactical concern for the Republican leadership, but it also must be noted that Iraq has not been a driving feature in the larger picture either -- and that this affects the federal government at almost all levels.

McCaffrey's contention -- that only the military and the CIA are at war -- speaks to an important point, and one that links up directly with the nation's "business as usual" response to the 9/11 attacks.

The president's "business as usual" strategy was a crucial psychological component to the war against jihadists. Fears of a major economic recession were prominent in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. On Sept. 10, 2001, increasing America's savings rate was a long-term goal for the administration, but at the time of the attacks, a downturn already was taking hold, and both policymakers and market-makers worried that a rapid, marked decline in personal spending would send the economy into a tailspin.

From this, the administration's position on personal sacrifice -- make none -- was born. However, it is a mindset that also has permeated the federal government and executive branch, with possibly unforeseen consequences that now have produced a political schism. Both the business and government communities were advised to go about their affairs, leaving the military and intelligence communities to worry about fighting terrorists, so as not to amplify the psychological effects of the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.

However, because Iraq has been, from the start, a war of U.S. choosing, the "business as usual" attitude shifted from a purely financial one to a political one as well. If Iraq brought with it economic hardship -- whether through higher taxes or decreased availability of goods and services -- it would have been a political disaster for the administration. The approach to Iraq, therefore, was the same as the war against al Qaeda: People, acting as civil servants, consumers or beneficiaries of government assistance, should do nothing differently in day-to-day life, and the military would do its job. The larger expense of the war would be borne by deficit spending, and -- by the GOP's logic -- the financial deficits that followed likely would anger only the (largely captive) libertarian wing of the Republican Party.

The GOP Blocs

Within the party itself, the "business as usual" mantra has played out differently among key segments of supporters, with varying implications. Again, the differences between the Beltway perspective and mainstream public's perspective on the war are striking.

The Business Lobby

The main topics of conversation among K Street lobbyists have remained regulatory affairs, tax policy and access to markets, rather than the war. This makes Iraq an unusual study in the history of U.S. war efforts.

The business community long has taken an active interest in foreign policy issues. It was active throughout the Cold War in helping the U.S. government voice the need for open markets -- a direct challenge to the closed system of the Soviet Union -- and it helped successive administrations form priorities in terms of balancing military, trade and economic concerns. During World War II, the business sector became an adjunct to the federal government, providing whatever the government ordered for the war effort. And during Vietnam and Korea, the business lobby played a critical role in communicating the long-term financial and political implications of the war.

In each of these cases, business clearly articulated its interest in the war. But since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, business has followed the lead of the executive branch. It has neither taken a clear position on the war as a group, nor lobbied for anything outside of its own narrow self-interest. As industry focused on "business as usual" -- debates over regulatory systems and tax policy -- the administration lost an opportunity to hear the viewpoint of the business establishment. This is something that presidents in past wars were able to use to their advantage. The Bush administration lost out on this opportunity both because it did not seek the input of the business community on war issues, and because business did not move to provide that to the administration.

Why that should be the case is debatable. Some would say it is because President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, though businessmen themselves, and with linkages to the Fortune 500 elite, have included few business alumni in their inner circle. Not many White House insiders -- whether political, administrative or policymaking -- come from the business community or even have worked as business lawyers. Others argue that the business community's continued reluctance to play an overt role is the result of anti-war claims that "big business" got the United States into the war in the first place. When charges of a "war for oil" seemed to draw popular attention, it is possible that the business community chose to keep its distance -- and thus preserve the goodwill of the administration and congressional heavyweights -- rather than risk its reputation and individual brand names. Still others point to an increasingly professional Washington lobbying establishment dominated by career politicians and their staffs. These professionals are Washington creatures, whose views of issues are colored by location and, more importantly, by the insularity of the Washington community.

The Evangelicals

The evangelical Christian right also has been relatively quiet in the debate over Iraq. Rather than providing moral guidance, attempting to offer a staunch moral justification for the war or even attempting to oppose the war effort, conservative evangelicals generally have offered quiet support for the president and, otherwise, stood aside as the decisions have been made. This is clearly the safest course for the evangelical leadership, particularly those most closely tied to the Republican Party: The religious right's commitment to the party is beginning to fray, and the chief challenge facing Republican leaders over the next two years is finding ways to keep the bulk of evangelical Christians engaged in national-level politics.

Their followers know people who are in harm's way and have deep concerns about how the war is fought. Still, evangelical leadership has remained on the sidelines. Given the power and influence that the evangelicals have built up over the past decade, their silence on the war issue comes across almost as an abdication.

The Hawks

Of the major Republican blocs, only the foreign policy hawks (primarily military and retired military personnel) have been active on war issues. For the most part, this group has been divided by allegiance to the commander-in-chief -- a president they generally like and understand -- and growing recognition that the leadership has failed in its prosecution of the war. The growing currency of the idea that the Defense Department, particularly Donald Rumsfeld, failed American troops was toxic to the Republican Party, but this lobby did not have the clear will, leadership and access to drive this point home to the administration. Some merely left the party in November, voting Democratic as a protest; many others sat the election out.

The Schism

The sum total of all of these trends has been to produce a crucial gap between the political machinery inside the Beltway and the American public. With business and evangelicals not discussing the war at all, and the war hawks divided in sentiment, there was no one from outside the administration who could convince the president and his closest advisers that the country needed to shift course in the war -- or at the very least, that retaining Rumsfeld as defense secretary eventually would cost the GOP control of Congress. Influential outside lobbies usually provide these points of view; on Iraq, they have been muted -- and the few who have spoken out have been ignored.

The problem, of course, is that almost every average American knows someone who has been sent to Iraq or has seen the disruption that the military deployments have on the lives of these individuals and their families. Outside the Beltway, the war is very real. The November election made it clear that voters not only are interested in the war, but were prepared to cast their ballots with Iraq at the forefront of their minds. The distance between these voters and the political leadership is remarkable. Even more remarkable, however, is the fact that none of the intermediate players who typically would have influence -- the conservative evangelicals, labor, business or mainline Protestant denominations -- have been heavily involved in the conduct of this war, and none appear anxious to change that now.

The forthcoming report of the Iraq Study Group -- the bipartisan panel commissioned by Bush to study policy options on the war -- can be expected to reawaken Beltway factions and debate, at least briefly. And the group may indeed be capable of recommending improvements over current strategy in the war. However, the silence from the idea mill in Washington -- not just the official think tanks, but also the informal gatherings of intelligent, well-informed lobbyists and government officials -- already has had a lasting impact on the nation.

The below items are from a post at Michelle Malkin's blog titled "Indian clerics frown on "un-Islamic ringtones"" which you can read here

These last lines really sum up the so-called religion of peace.

I needn't remind you of what happens to those who insult Islam.

***

P.S. So, Koran ringtones are out, but where's the clerics' uproar over using cell phones to commit terrorism in the name of Islam?

This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

A Fresh Look at the Draft

By George Friedman

New York Democrat Charles Rangel, the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has called for the reinstatement of the draft. This is not new for him; he has argued for it for several years. Nor does Rangel -- or anyone else -- expect a proposal for conscription to pass. However, whether this is political posturing or a sincere attempt to start a conversation about America's military, Rangel is making an important point that should be considered. This is doubly true at a time when future strategies are being considered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the available force is being strained to its limits.

The United States has practiced conscription in all major wars since the Civil War. During the Cold War, the United States practiced conscription continually, using it to fight both the Korean and Vietnam wars, but also to maintain the peacetime army. Conscription ended in 1973 as the U.S. role in Vietnam declined and as political opposition to the draft surged. From that point on, the United States shifted to a volunteer force.

Rangel's core criticism of the volunteer force is social. He argues that the burden of manning the military and fighting the war has fallen, both during Vietnam War conscription and in the volunteer army, for different reasons, on the lower and middle-lower classes. Apart from other arguments -- such as the view that if the rich were being drafted, the Vietnam and Iraq wars would have ended sooner -- Rangel's essential point is that the way the United States has manned the military since World War II is inherently unjust. It puts the lower classes at risk in fighting wars, leaving the upper classes free to pursue their lives and careers.

The problem with this argument is not the moral point, which is that the burden of national defense should be borne by all classes, but rather the argument that a draft would be more equitable. Rangel's view of the military and the draft was shaped by Vietnam -- and during Vietnam, there was conscription. But it was an inherently inequitable conscription, in the sense that during most of the war, deferments were given for students. That deferment, earlier in the war, extended to graduate school. As a result, by definition, the less-educated were more vulnerable to conscription than the more-educated. There were a host of deferments, including medical deferments, and the sophisticated could game the system easily. A draft, by itself, does not in any way guarantee equity.

During the final years of the Vietnam-era draft, the deferment system was replaced by a lottery. This was intended to (and, to some extent, did) reduce the inequities of the system, although sophisticated college students with low numbers continued to find ways to avoid conscription using the complex rules of the Selective Service system -- ways that the less-educated still couldn't use. The lottery system was an improvement, but in the end, it still meant that some would go into harm's way while others would stay home and carry on their lives. Basing the draft on a lottery might have mitigated social injustice, but basing life-and-death matters such as going to war on the luck of the draw still strikes us as inappropriate.

The switch from deferments to the lottery points out one of the key problems of conscription. The United States does not need, and cannot afford, a military that would consist of all of the men (and now, we assume, women) aged 19-21. That would create a force far too large and far too inexperienced. The lottery was designed to deal with a reality in which the United States needed conscription, but could not cope with universal conscription. Some method had to be found to determine who would and would not serve -- and any such method would be either unfair or arbitrary.

Americans remember World War II as, in many ways, the morally perfect war: the right enemy, the right spirit and the right military. But World War II was unique in that the United States had to field an enormous military. While some had to man truly essential industries, and some were medically disqualified, World War II was a case in which universal conscription was absolutely needed because the size of the force had to be equal to the size of the total pool of available and qualified manpower, minus essential workers. Unless it suited the needs of the military, no one was deferred. Married men with children, brilliant graduate students, the children of the rich and famous -- all went. There were still inequities in the kinds of assignments people got and the pull that was sometimes used. But what made the World War II conscription system work well was that everyone was needed and everyone was called.

Not everyone is needed in today's military. You might make the case for universal service -- people helping teachers and cleaning playgrounds. But there is a fundamental difference between these jobs and, at least in principle, the military. In the military, you might be called on to risk your life and die. For the most part, that isn't expected from teacher's aides. Thus, even if there were universal service, you would still be left with the dilemma of who gets to teach arts and crafts and who goes on patrol in Baghdad. Universal conscription does not solve the problem inherent in military conscription.

And there is an even more fundamental issue. During World War II, conscription, for just about everyone, meant service until the end of the war. During the Cold War, there was no clear end in sight. Since not everyone was conscripted, having conscripts serve until the end of the war could mean a lifetime of service. The decision was made that draftees would serve for two years and remain part of the reserve for a period of time thereafter.

Training during World War II took weeks for most combat specialties, with further training undertaken with soldiers' units or through combat. In World War II, the United States had a mass-produced army with plenty of time to mature after training. During Vietnam, conscripts went through basic training and advanced training, leaving a year for deployment in Vietnam and some months left over after the tour of duty. Jobs that required more complex training, from Special Forces to pilots to computer programmers, were handled by volunteers who served at least three years and, in many cases, longer. The draftee was used to provide the mass. The complexities of the war were still handled by a volunteer force.

The Battle of the Bulge took place 62 years ago. The Tet Offensive was nearly 39 years ago. The 90-day-wonder officers served well in World War II, and the draftee riflemen were valiant in Vietnam, but military requirements have changed dramatically. Now the military depends on highly trained specialists and groups of specialists, whose specialties -- from rifleman to warehouse worker -- have become more and more complex and sophisticated. On the whole, the contemporary Army, which historically has absorbed most draftees, needs more than two years in order to train draftees in their specialties, integrate them with their units and deploy them to combat.

Today, a two-year draft would be impractical because, on the whole, it would result in spending huge amounts of money on training, with very little time in actual service to show for it. Conscription could, of course, be extended to a three- or even four-year term, but with only selective service -- meaning that only a fraction of those eligible would be called -- that extension would only intensify the unfairness. Some would spend three or four years in the military, while others would be moving ahead with schools and careers. In effect, it would be a huge tax on the draftees for years of earnings lost.

A new U.S. draft might force the children of the wealthy into the military, but only at the price of creating other inequities and a highly inefficient Army. The training cycle and retention rate of a two-year draft would swamp the Army. In Iraq, the Army needs Special Forces, Civil Affairs specialists, linguists, intelligence analysts, unmanned aerial vehicle operators and so on. You can draft for that, we suppose, but it is hard to imagine building a force that way.

A volunteer force is a much more efficient way to field an Army. There is more time for training, there is a higher probability of retention and there are far fewer morale problems. Rangel is wrong in comparing the social base of this Army with that of Vietnam. But the basic point he is trying to make is true: The makeup of the U.S. Army is skewed toward the middle and lower-middle class. But then, so are many professions. Few children of the wealthy get jobs in the Social Security Administration or become professional boxers. The fact that the Army does not reflect the full social spectrum of the country doesn't mean very much. Hardly anything reflects that well.

Still, Rangel is making an important point, even if his argument for the draft does not work. War is a special activity of society. It is one of the few in which the citizen is expected -- at least in principle -- to fight and, if necessary, die for his country. It is more than a career. It is an existential commitment, a willingness to place oneself at risk for one's country. The fact that children of the upper classes, on the whole, do not make that existential commitment represents a tremendous weakness in American society. When those who benefit most from a society feel no obligation to defend it, there is a deep and significant malaise in that society.

However, we have been speaking consistently here about the children of the rich, and not of the rich themselves. Combat used to be for the young. It required stamina and strength. That is still needed. However, there are two points to be made. First, many -- perhaps most -- jobs in today's military that do not require the stamina of youth, as proven by all the contractors doing essentially military work in Iraq. Second, 18- to 22-year-olds are far from the most physically robust age group. Given modern diet and health regimens, there are people who are substantially older who have the stamina and strength for combat duty. If you can play tennis as well as you claim to for as long as you say, you can patrol a village in the Sunni Triangle.

We do not expect to be taken seriously on this proposal, but we will make it anyway: There is no inherent reason why enlistment -- or conscription -- should be targeted toward those in late adolescence. And there is no reason why the rich themselves, rather than the children of the rich, should not go to war. Or, for that matter, why older people with established skills should not be drawn into the military. That happened in World War II, and it could happen now. The military's stove-pipe approach to military careers, and the fact that it allows almost no lateral movement into service for 40- to 60-year-olds, is irrational. Even if we exclude combat arms, other specialties could be well-served by such a method -- which also would reduce the need for viciously expensive contractors.

Traditionally, the draft has fallen on those who were barely adults, who had not yet had a chance to live, who were the least equipped to fight a complex war. Other age groups were safe. Rangel is talking about drafting the children of the rich. It would be much more interesting, if the United States were to introduce the draft, to impose it in a different way, on entirely different age groups. Let the young get on with starting their lives. Let those who have really benefited from society, who have already lived, ante up.

Modern war does not require the service of 19-year-olds. In the field, you need the strong, agile and smart, but we know several graying types who still could hack that. And in the offices that proliferate in the military, experienced businesspeople would do even better at modernizing the system. If they were drafted, and went into harm's way, they would know exactly what they were fighting for and why -- something we hardly think most 19-year-olds really know yet.

Obviously, no one is going to adopt this crackpot proposal, even though we are quite serious about it. But we ask that you take seriously two points. Rangel is correct in saying that the upper classes in American society are not pulling their weight. But if the parents haven't served, we cannot reasonably expect the children to do so. If Americans are serious about dealing with the crisis of lack of service among the wealthiest, then they should look to the wealthiest first, rather than their children.

This report republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

Al Qaeda's Pan-Maghreb Gambit

By Fred Burton

Spanish newspaper El Periodico reported Nov. 20 that Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) -- which recently swore allegiance to al Qaeda -- has been instructed to form a unified command with Morocco's Islamic Combatant Group, Libya's Islamic Fighting Group and several Tunisian groups, most notably the Tunisian Combatant Group. The new organization reportedly will be called The Union of the Arab Maghreb. The newspaper cited Spanish anti-terrorism intelligence sources, who said the information regarding the creation of the new unified network was derived from a plan Moroccan police discovered in one of several raids over the summer.

The al Qaeda concept of creating a unified group of "Qaedat al-Jihad in the Arab Maghreb Countries" is not new. Moroccan authorities discovered plans for such a union in late 2005, when raids targeting several suspected militants turned up messages sent by leaders in the region to Osama bin Laden. In those messages, leaders reportedly discussed a plan for the GSPC to officially join al Qaeda and then unite jihadists in the Maghreb countries -- in many ways conforming to the pattern established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who united jihadists in Jordan and Iraq. Significantly, the GSPC effort would also strive to unite North African militants living in Europe into a cohesive paramilitary entity.

El Periodico's report would seem to confirm that plans for the pan-Maghreb merger have proceeded. Other signs of traction came from Ayman al-Zawahiri, who said in a Sept. 11, 2006, message that GSPC had joined forces with al Qaeda in a union he hoped would be "a thorn in the neck of the American and French Crusaders and their allies, and an arrow in the heart of the French traitors and apostates." Al-Zawahiri went on to say, "We ask Allah to help our brothers of the GSPC to hit the foundations of the Crusader alliance, primarily their old leader the infidel United States, praise be on Allah." On Sept. 13, GSPC acknowledged the merger on its Web site with a message from its emir, Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, who wrote that, "We have full confidence in the faith, the doctrine, the method and the modes of action of [al Qaeda's] members, as well as their leaders and religious guides."

The fact that al Qaeda pressed on with plans for a Maghreb merger, despite the arrests of more than 50 suspects in Morocco and the fact that the plan was exposed, indicates that the group (and its new local subsidiaries) has some compelling reasons to do so. As Stratfor has noted, acting alone, the GSPC has been unable to derail the peace process between the Algerian government and the country's main Islamist movement, Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). Militant groups in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya are also struggling to gain traction in their respective countries. Linking with each other and al Qaeda will provide them with a boost -- and will provide al Qaeda an important new geographic base and operational arm.


The Motives for Mergers

The plan to unite the disparate militant groups operating in the Maghreb under al Qaeda's banner makes perfect sense from the jihadist perspective. (The name proposed for this new network should not be confused with the Arab Maghreb Union, a pan-Arab trade agreement aiming for economic and political unity in Northern Africa).

Since its foundation, al Qaeda has applied the principles of unity and strength in numbers. The declaration by the so-called "World Islamic Front" in 1998 of "jihad against Jews and Crusaders" was signed not only by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri (who represented what was then an independent group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad), but also by representatives of Egypt's Gamaah al-Islamiyah, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. Al Qaeda leaders later forged close ties with groups such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia.

Within al Qaeda, there is a culture of inclusion, and -- though the existence of strong Saudi and Egyptian cadres has been noted -- commanders have been promoted for the most part on the basis of their faith and merit rather than ethnicity or national origin. Commanders from East Asia, Africa and South Asia also have been joined by the likes of Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ahmed Ressam from states in the Maghreb. Indeed, men from the Maghreb states, and Morocco in particular, occupy a considerable (and disproportionate) number of leadership positions in the central al Qaeda organization. Moreover, Stratfor has received unconfirmed reports that more than 400 North Africans are being trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.

In announcing the GSPC merger, al-Zawahiri issued a reminder to "all my brothers who act in the service of Islam, who help the Muslims to resist the Zionist-Crusader campaign, and myself, of the need for unity, which is the door to victory. This unity is a religious duty upon the Muslims while confronting their enemies."

Al Qaeda's doctrine of unity is rooted not only in theology but in very practical considerations as well. From experiences in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and now in Iraq, the jihadists have learned about the tactical and strategic value of joining forces. Al-Zarqawi was able to transform several smaller jihadist groups in Iraq into a unified, effective insurgent force -- not to mention a prodigious media entity. Indeed, many jihadists from the Maghreb have traveled to Iraq to fight. In September 2005, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that 600 Algerians were fighting as foreign jihadists in Iraq. At the time, this was believed to be 20 percent of the total strength of the foreign insurgents in Iraq -- the largest of any single group. Moroccan militant networks have also been instrumental in funneling jihadists from Europe to Iraq. This exposure to the jihad in Iraq and their experience with al-Zarqawi's organization reportedly helped to propel the unification scheme in their home region. By uniting, small organizations are better able to maximize resources -- sharing finance and logistics networks and important nodes, such as training camps. It also allows them to use the al Qaeda "brand name" for recruiting and propaganda purposes.

Implications of the Merger

Moroccan authorities also reportedly received information from their Pakistani counterparts that a key aide to al-Zawahiri recently traveled to Morocco using a Thai passport, masquerading as an Asian antiques merchant. His objective was to coordinate the activities of a number of fundamentalist groups in North Africa -- presumably a reference to the merger now being discussed by El Periodico.

This information complements reports from Stratfor sources in the region, who say the leaders of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia feel threatened by an Islamic fundamentalist "tsunami" they believe might strike within the next five years. Because of this threat, Moroccan King Muhammad VI, Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika and Tunisian President Zayn al-Abidin bin Ali reportedly are preparing (quietly) for a joint security summit.

Of course, political leaders in the region are not alone in their concerns. The United States recently announced that it wants to add Libya to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a group of nine North and West African countries cooperating with Washington against Islamist militants. There are growing concerns about the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group -- and Washington is especially concerned that al Qaeda might be seeking sanctuary in TSCTP territories. Al Qaeda also seems to be gaining influence with Western Saraha's Polisario Movement, many of the leaders of which have let their beards grow in the fundamentalist tradition. They openly call for introducing the rule of the Caliphate in the Arab Maghreb -- the goal espoused by the groups now partnering with al Qaeda.

Tactically speaking, the Maghreb is not as strategically significant to the United States or other "crusader" powers as the Middle East, but it still features a number of economically important targets, including Western oil companies operating in Algeria and Libya and tourist sites in Tunisia and Morocco.

Since the 2003 bombings in Casablanca, there have been few terrorist strikes in the region that bore al Qaeda's imprimatur -- though militant activity has been a low constant. The simultaneous truck bomb attacks against two Algerian police stations on Oct. 30 did bear some characteristics of an al Qaeda operation -- and perhaps a hint of al Qaeda influence -- but there were some stark differences as well. For instance, the attacks occurred at night, rather than at a time when casualties would be high.

That said, such tactical differences likely will begin to dissipate as the al Qaeda-Maghreb militant relationship deepens. Ultimately, al Qaeda's previously effective strategies and attack templates likely will become more prominent in the Maghreb. By this, we mean an increase in attacks against oil-related targets (like the uptick seen in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen) and more strikes against soft tourist targets such as restaurants, resorts and hotels (like those seen in Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Kenya). Additionally, the use of suicide bombers -- which are not generally part of the GSPC repertoire -- is likely to increase. The Moroccans certainly have already incorporated the suicide bomber tactic. The 2003 Casablanca attacks, in which 14 suicide operatives were dispatched, involved the largest number of suicide operatives seen in a single operation other than 9/11.

North African militants also will benefit from the training in operational security and tradecraft they can receive from al Qaeda cadre. Those who are traveling to fronts like Iraq already are receiving some of this type of training, but under the new arrangement al Qaeda will be able to dispatch personnel to serve, in a sense, as adjunct professors at camps run by groups such as the GSPC in the region. This means more men from the Maghreb will have access to the training since they will no longer have to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan to attend al Qaeda camps. This also allows al Qaeda to diversify its training camps and provides continuity in case it loses a camp elsewhere.

Strategically, a focus on the Maghreb makes sense for al Qaeda: The region has a long history of militant Islamism and of struggling against colonial and "apostate" rulers. Moreover, there is geographic proximity to Europe, and many North Africans have close ties to Europe and North America via their friends and family residing in large North African communities in places such as Paris, Amsterdam, Milan and Montreal. That makes the region a great springboard not only for operatives looking to carry out strikes in Europe, but also for proselytizers seeking to unify and radicalize the large North African communities in the continent. Those communities can act as either support networks or as camouflage for jihadist operatives.

Though the focus of jihadist combat operations is Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe long has served as an important logistical and support base for jihadists. In recent years, however, it has become an operational theater as well -- as the 2004 and 2005 attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London demonstrated. Italian authorities have thwarted several attacks in the last five years -- as has France, which was singled out in al-Zawahiri's 9/11 anniversary message and could be the site of the next al Qaeda-linked attack.

However, the Maghreb node faces a completely different operational environment than the chaos of Iraq. The Maghreb countries have central governments and military, law enforcement and intelligence units that have been fighting Islamist insurgents for decades. With the exception of Libya, these countries are also closely tied to Western military and intelligence agencies and have been cooperating with them for some time. The plan to add Libya to the TSCTP is intended to plug that gap. In this hostile environment, operational security and terrorist tradecraft will be vital, as will the node's leadership.

Since the organization is based on the model of al Qaeda in Iraq, GSPC will assume the central role in the organization like Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad did in Iraq. Furthermore, al-Wadoud, the emir of the GSPC, will take on the leadership role that was so skillfully played by al-Zarqawi in Iraq. As we have seen from Iraq (and from al Qaeda's organization in Saudi Arabia), the strength of the local leader has a significant impact on the performance of the al Qaeda regional branches. When the leader is strong and organized, the branch is efficient and deadly; when the leader is weak and incapable, the branch either loses its effectiveness or never congeals into an effective force in the first place. In this case, the proof will indeed be in the pudding, as it remains to be seen whether al-Wadoud possesses the leadership skills necessary to mold this new group into a cohesive and effective organization.

Should al-Wadoud prove to be a commander of the caliber of al-Zarqawi or Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, a noticeable uptick in the number and quality of attacks in the region can be expected. From there, as seen with al-Zarqawi's organization, the new Maghreb branch could project its power and conduct attacks in neighboring countries -- in this case, in Europe.

I picked up this quote in a Washington Times article titled "Bumpy Road for Science" by Henry Miller, dated November 19, 2006.

  "Mark Twain had it right: "Suppose you were an idiot and suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself." "